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ACCOUNTING  FOR THE  NEW RELIGION
Martha Minow*
What  do  American  schools,  prisons,  welfare  agencies,  and  social
service  programs  have  in  common?  These  institutions  have  been
largely  or exclusively  public  in terms  of their funding, operations,  and
identities  over  the  past forty  years.'  Yet they  now face  major  experi-
ments  in  privatization.  Public  dollars  increasingly  can  be spent  pur-
chasing  private  schooling,  and  private  companies  have  entered  the
business  of managing  public  schools.  Public  dollars  flow  through con-
tracts  with private  corporations,  nonprofit organizations,  and  religious
groups  to  run  public  schools  and  prisons  and  to  deliver  welfare-to-
work and  other  social  services.  What  happens  to the  scope  and  con-
tent of  public  values  when  public  commitments  proceed  through  pri-
vate agents?
This question demands  historical  context.  The particular  trends  in
privatization  are  new,  and  yet  they  highlight  the  longstanding  and
complex  interactions  between  public  and  private  social  provision  in
this country.2  A  variety  of for-profit  and  nonprofit  organizations  pro-
*  Professor,  Harvard  Law  School.  Some  of  the  ideas  here  grow  from  MARTHA  MINOW,
PARTNERS,  NOT  RIVALS:  PRIVATIZATION  AND  THE  PUBLIC  GOOD  (2002).  This Article  was
presented  as the  2003  Kenan  Distinguished  Lecture,  Duke University.  Thanks to  George  Hicks,
Anne  Robinson,  Stephen  Shackelford,  and  Alix  Smith  for  research  assistance,  and  to  Joe  Singer,
Orly Lobel,  Vicky Spelman,  and editors of the Harvard  Law Review for valuable  advice.
1  Defining what  is "public"  and  what  is "private"  turns out  to  be  complicated  in  part due  to
the  history of interconnections between governmental  and  private initiatives.  See Part I infra.  In
the  United  States,  "public"  has  potentially  three meanings:  (i)  pertaining  to the government,  (2)
pertaining  to spaces  and processes  open to the general population  or "the  people," or (3)  pertaining
to  any  sphere  outside  the  most  intimate,  which  usually  means  outside  of the  home  and  family.
Even  the  first  meaning  lends  itself  to contest  and ambiguity.  See  Frank  H.  Easterbrook,  The
State of Madison's  Vision  of the  State: A  Public Choice Perspective, 107  HARV.  L.  REV  1328,
1328  (1994)  (questioning  the  relationship  between  legislatures,  courts,  and  the  public  interest).
The  second  and third meanings  of  public introduce  further  complexities,  given  that  the govern-
ment  itself supplies  critical  definitions affecting  the spaces  and  processes  open  to  the population,
and  even  defines  what  counts  as  a family  and  what  counts  as  a religion,  at least  for  important
purposes such  as tax  treatment.  For further discussion,  see  MINOW, supra note  *, at 29-35;  Mor-
ton  J.  Horwitz,  The  History of the  Public/Private Distinction, 130  U.  PA.  L.  REV.  1423,  1426
(1982);  Frances  E. Olsen,  The  Family and the Market: A  Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,  96
HARV.  L.  REV.  1497  (1983).  For  a  nuanced  treatment  of the  public-private  distinction  and  its
shifts  in  terms  of  physical  space  and gender  roles,  see  SARAH  DEUTSCH,  WOMEN  AND  THE
CITY: GENDER, SPACE, AND  POWER IN  BOSTON,  1870-I94o,  at 6-24,  133-134  (2000).
2  Social  provision here  refers  to the  variety of individual  and  collective  efforts to respond  to
basic  human  needs, such  as schooling;  income  supports and  subsidies  for housing, food,  and  pre-
scription  drugs; social services  addressing child abuse and  neglect; detoxification  programs;  health
care;  dispute  resolution;  and  corrections.  Historically, a  mix  of public  and  private,  secular  and
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vide  education,  health  care,  day  care,  elderly  care,  and  other  services
through public subsidies.3  This Article seeks to avoid the partisan  and
polarized  debates  over  privatization  by  examining  its  potential  for
both  good  and  disturbing  effects  against  the  backdrop  of  historical
practices, evolving public  norms, and vital public accountability.
The  new  versions  of  privatization  potentially  jeopardize  public
purposes  by  pressing  for  market-style  competition,  by  sidestepping
norms  that  apply  to  public  programs,  and  by  eradicating  the  public
identity of social efforts  to meet human  needs.  Inviting new providers
into  a  market-based  system  to  provide  schooling  and  social  services
will  produce  at least some  failures, with  harms  to vulnerable  children
and adults, and  will rely  on informed  choosers  when that may be  pre-
cisely what  we do not have.  Privatization  may also  undermine  public
commitments  both  to  ensure  fair and  equal  treatment and  to prevent
discrimination  on the  basis  of race, gender, religion,  or sexual orienta-
tion.  If competition  can  be  harnessed  through  public  accountability
requirements,  however,  innovations  and  plural  forms  of social  provi-
sion will  strengthen  the nation's total response  to people in need.  This
Article  explores the risks  but looks also to the promise  of privatization,
if coupled with requirements  for accountability in public terms.
Although  the  term  "privatization"  covers  a  variety of different  ac-
tivities,  a  useful  definition  encompasses  the  range  of  efforts  by  gov-
ernments  to move  public  functions  into private hands  and to use  mar-
ket-style  competition.4  Current privatization  efforts involve  both  for-
profit and nonprofit  organizations  - including  religious  entities - in
performing  public  responsibilities  or  addressing  public  needs.  These
privatization  developments  cut across  many fields,  but schooling  gen-
erates  the  most  attention,  perhaps  because  it  potentially  affects  the
most people  or involves the critical functions  of educating and  socializ-
ing  children.  States  and  localities,  pressed  by  a  variety  of  private
groups,  have  launched  experiments  in  school choice,  including  vouch-
ers  for  private  schooling  and  charters  for  start-up  schools.  The  Su-
religious,  for-profit and nonprofit  providers  has emerged  in  the United States  in each  of these  ar-
eas.
3  Henry  Hansmann,  The  Changing Roles  of  Public, Private, and Nonprofit Enterprise in
Education,  Health  Care,  and  Other  Human  Services,  in  INDIVIDUAL  AND  SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY:  CHILD  CARE,  EDUCATION,  MEDICAL  CARE,  AND LONG-TERM  CARE  IN
AMERICA 245  (Victor R.  Fuchs ed.,  1996).
4  See Jody Freeman,  Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization,  i 16 HARV.  L. REV.
1285,  1287  (2003).  Privatization  can  include  using publicly funded  vouchers to  permit eligible  re-
cipients to purchase  goods  or services  in  the  private  market,  government  contracts with  private
providers, and  using  private  entities  to set  public  standards.  See Matthew  Diller, Going Private
- The  Future of Social  Welfare Policy?, 35  CLEARINGHOUSE  REV  491,  491  (2002).  Rather
than diminishing  government,  privatization  may  preserve  or enlarge  public  spending.  See  id.  at
497.
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preme  Court's  recent  decision  in Zelman v.  Simmons-Harris' signaled
a  green  light  for  vouchers  and set  the  agenda for  public  deliberations
about school reform  for the next decade.  A  Florida court's rejection  of
that state's voucher program  under the state constitution 6  and a Maine
court's  rejection  of a  challenge  to  a school  tuition  plan  that excluded
religious  schools7  are  further  indications  that  the  legal  and  political
debates  will continue  for some time.8
Less  obviously, but no  less importantly,  these debates  expose  other
activities  that  cross  the  boundaries  not  only  between  public  and pri-
vate,  but  also  between  secular  and  religious  and  between  nonprofit
and for-profit  institutions  dealing with  social  welfare.  School  voucher
programs  use public  dollars  to purchase  private education,  most often
at religious  schools. 9  Yet  even within  public  school systems,  local  gov-
5  122  S.  Ct. 2460 (2002).
6  See  Holmes v. Bush,  No. CV  99-3370,  2002  WL  1809079,  at  *I  (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug.  5,  2002)
(striking down  a voucher  scholarship  program  as a violation  of the  Florida Constitution,  which
states that "[no revenue  of the  state  or any  political  subdivision  or  agency  thereof  shall ever  be
taken  from  the  public  treasury  directly  or indirectly  in  aid  of any  church,  sect,  or religious  de-
nomination or in aid  of any sectarian  institution").
7  Bagley  v.  Raymond  Sch.  Dep't,  728 A.2d  127,  147  (Me.  1999)  ("[T]he  current exclusion  of
religious  schools  from  Maine's  tuition program  does  not violate  the  Free  Exercise  or  Establish-
ment  Clauses  of  the  First  Amendment  or  the  Equal  Protection  mandates  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment.").
8  See  Lynn  Porter, Voucher Opponents Rally in  Largo, TAMPA TRIB.,  Oct.  I,  2002,  at  1, avail-
able at 2002  WL 26174905  (describing a circuit court ruling that school  vouchers  violate  the Flor-
ida constitution  and rallies organized  in opposition); see also Laurie  Goodstein,  In  States, Hurdles
Loom,  N.Y. TIMES, June  30, 2002,  § 4, at 3  (forecasting challenges to Washington  State's constitu-
tional  ban  on  public  payments  to  religious  schools);  Tan  Vinh,  Limits  on Student  Teachers Tar-
geted; Suit Filed Against Ban on Parochial-School  Work, SEATTLE  TIMES,  Sept. 26,  2002,  at Bi,
available at 2oo2  WL  3915268;  Monte  Whaley,  Old Law May  Be  Voucher Stopper. Amendment
Passed in  i8o0s,  DENVER  POST,  July  22,  2002,  at  Bi  (noting  that  the  Colorado  Constitution
"may  be used to thwart  the school  voucher movement in  the state").  At issue  in many of the state
cases (though  not in  Maine) are  the  Blaine  amendments,  adopted  to forbid state  subsidy  of reli-
gious  instruction  as part  of the  anti-Catholic  movement in  the  i88os.  See Frank  A. Shepherd  &
Harold  E.  Johnson,  Florida Antivoucher  Court Ruling  Gives  Lesson  in  "Three  R's",  TAMPA
TRIB., Aug.  i8,  2002,  at  i.  For a dispute about  the history  of the  amendments,  compare Nathan
J.  Diament, Don't Battle Vouchers with a Bigots' Law, NEWSDAY, Aug. 23,  2002,  available  at 2002
WL  2759229,  and  Thomas  Roeser,  Catholic Schools  Need  No  Shackles; Government  Vouchers
Come with Strings, CHI. SUN-TIMES,  Aug. 21,  2002,  at  12,  available at 2002  WL 6469727, with K.
Hollyn  Hollman,  Dredging Up Ugliness in  the Name of Vouchers, WASH.  POST, Aug. 31,  2002,  at
A23. See  also  Kotterman  v. Killian,  972  P2d  6o6  (Ariz.  1999)  (rejecting  a  challenge  to  a state
statute  allowing  a  tax  credit  for  donations  to  school  tuition  organizations,  despite  a  Blaine
Amendment in the Arizona Constitution).
9  Current school  reforms include voucher programs in  Cleveland,  Ohio, and Milwaukee,  Wis-
consin;  such  programs  allow  a limited  number of low-income  families  to  obtain public  resources
to  pay for  education  at private  schools, which  in  practice  are largely  religious  schools.  See Zel-
man,  122  S.  Ct.  2460  (2002);  Jackson  v.  Benson,  578  N.W.2d  602  (Wis.  1998);  see  also  GEN.
ACCOUNTING  OFFICE,  SCHOOL  VOUCHERS:  PUBLICLY  FUNDED  PROGRAMS  IN
CLEVELAND  AND  MILWAUKEE  25  (2001);  PEOPLE  FOR  AM.  WAY  FOUND.,  A  PAINFUL
PRICE:  HOW  THE  MILWAUKEE  VOUCHER  SURCHARGE  UNDERCUTS  WISCONSIN'S
EDUCATION PRIORITIES  (2002), available at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/dfiles/file-27.pdf.
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ernments  already  contract  with  private  management  companies,  in-
cluding  those  organized  to  make  profits.'0  Public  education  dollars
also support entrepreneurial  charter schools  and mimic markets  by of-
fering  parents  choices  among public  schools  and  programs.  Similarly,
spurred  by federal  law, state  and local  governments  outsource  welfare
program  management  to  for-profit  companies  such  as  Lockheed  Mar-
tin  and  social-service  delivery  to  churches  and  religious  nonprofit  or-
ganizations.  States  and  localities  spend federal  dollars  with  religious
groups  that  run  Head  Start  programs,  participate  in  community-
service  block grants,  and operate  children's  health  programs.  Publicly
traded  companies and religious  groups manage  prisons; for-profit  com-
panies  and  religious  groups  run  welfare-to-work  programs  with  gov-
ernment funds.11
The  relationship  between  public  funding  and  religious  providers
raises special problems.  Allowing public  resources  to purchase services
provided  by  religious  institutions  or  to  finance  religious  instruction
raises constitutional, political, and practical concerns.' 2  Public funding
of religious schools and religious  social services  departs from  a concep-
tion of the  Constitution's  First Amendment  as  a mandate  to separate
religion  and  state.  Public  subsidies,  even  when  channeled  through
vouchers  redeemable  by individuals,  risk creating  perceptions  of gov-
ernment  endorsement  of religion.  Given  a scarcity  of other  good  op-
tions, publicly funded  vouchers  may also  pressure  people into religious
activities that they would  otherwise not choose.  Fear of religious  coer-
cion  or  religiously  motivated  intolerance  animates  those  who  most
steadfastly  argue for separating  religion  and government,  and  thus re-
ligion  and  schooling. 13  The  prospect  of  converting  schooling  that  is
nearly  universally  public  into  state-funded  private  and  religious
10  See  Michael  A.  Fletcher, Private Enterprise, Public Woes  in  Phila. Schools, WASH.  POST,
Sept. 17,  2002,  at AI.
11 See  Ahmed  A.  White,  Rule  of Law  and the Limits of Sovereignty: The  Private Prison in
Jurisprudential  Perspective, 38  AM.  CRIM.  L.  REV.  III  (2OOl);  Developments  in  the Law-The
Law  of Prisons, 115  HARV.  L. REV  1838,  1868  (2002)  [hereinafter  Developments]; Terry  Collins,
Inmates Find a  Blessing Behind Bars, STAR TRIB.  (Minneapolis),  Sept.  28,  2002,  at  IB;  Curtis
Krueger, Private Sector, Public Needs,  ST. PETERSBURG  TIMES,  Mar.  12,  2001,  at  1B;  Michele
McNeil  Solida,  Welfare Issue Intertwines Church, State, INDIANAPOLIS  NEWS/INDIANAPOLIS
STAR,  Aug.  1,  2002,  at Ai.  With  assistance  from  the federal  government,  religious  groups  have
also moved  into  the  banking and credit business  - and  critics  charge  that this  development  re-
flects governmental  failures to  address exorbitant inner-city  lending practices.  See  Stephen Man-
ning, Faith-Based  Banking Gets Boost from  U.S. Agency, CHI.  TRIB.,  Sept. 9,  2OO,  §  5,  at 8.
12 See Maureen Magee,  School Vouchers Upheld: Public Money Can Be Used at Private, Reli-
gious Institutions, SAN DIEGO  UNION-TRIB.,  June  28,  2002,  at Ai  (reporting  the  view  of  the
president  of  the  Californian  Teachers  Association);  Scott  Stephens,  Couple  Hope for  I  More
Voucher: Cleveland Parents of 12  Are Among  Those Petitioning Supreme Court, PLAIN  DEALER
(Cleveland), Sept.  28,  2001,  at Bi  (reporting  the  view of the  president  of the Ohio  Federation  of
Teachers).
13 See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC  EDUCATION (1g99).
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schooling  troubles  people  who  worry  about  social  and  religious  divi-
sions.  This worry  has  been  exacerbated  by  the  September  ii  attacks,
which  some  have  attributed  in  part to  political  indoctrination  by  reli-
gious  schools. 14
The provision  of social services  by houses  of worship  and other  re-
ligious institutions, a  high  priority for  President  George  W. Bush, trig-
gers  sharp  criticisms,  not only  from  those  who  worry  about  maintain-
ing  a  separation  between  church  and  state  but  also  from  those
concerned  that  government  aid  may  intrude  on  the  autonomy  and
freedom of religious  groups.1
5   Nonetheless,  federal  agencies  use public
resources  to  promote  the  involvement  of  religious  organizations  in
public  welfare. 16  State  governments  fund social-service  programs that
incorporate  religious practices or are  run under religious  auspices.'"
The  involvement  of  religious  and  secular  private  providers  of
schooling,  social  services,  and  housing  raises  questions  beyond  the
proper  relationship  between  government  and  religion.  Teachers'  un-
ions  warn  that  school  vouchers  for private  schools  will  drain  needed
resources  and engaged families  from  the public  school  system.  School
vouchers  may  undermine  state  and  national  initiatives  intended  to
raise  expectations  and  student  achievement  if  school  systems  use
vouchers  to  send  failing  students  to  private  schools  exempted  from
those  requirements.'8  For-profit  prisons  worry  people  who  wonder  if
profits  are  made  by  skimping  on  legal  protections  or  reducing  the
quality  of  conditions.' 9  Others  object that  a function  like  punishment
14  One political cartoonist  controversially  suggested a connection  between  school vouchers  and
religious  schools and thus religious terrorists.  See Paul Thoreson, Cartoon on Vouchers  Was Unfair
and in  Poor Taste,  SAN DIEGO  UNION-TRIB.,  Oct.  5,  2001,  at B9  (Letters) (criticizing  a cartoon
by Signe Wilkinson).
15  See Editorial, Keeping the Faith:  Allaying Discrimination  Concerns Could Avoid Showdown,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July  21,  2ooi,  at 26A.
16  See  Robyn  Blumner,  Bush  Does  an  End  Run  To  Help  Faith-Based  Initiatives,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,  Sept.  6,  2002,  at i iA, available at 2002  WL  24010846  (describing  the
effort by  the  federal  Departments  of Housing  and  Urban  Development  (HUD), Health and  Hu-
man  Services,  Justice, and Labor  to encourage  participation by faith-based organizations  in  feder-
ally funded programs);  Waveney  Ann Moore, Societal Healers Line Up for Bush Buffet of Grants,
ST. PETERSBURG  TIMES,  Aug.  7,  2002,  at  12,  available at  2002  WL  24118630  (same);  see  also
HUD's  Center  for  Faith-Based  and  Community  Initiatives,  at  http://www.hud.gov/offices/fbci/
index.cfm  (last visited  Feb. 9,  2003)  (providing public  information about federal  funding opportu-
nities for faith-based  groups).  Some of these efforts date back to efforts  launched by President  Bill
Clinton.  See Personal Responsibility and  Work Opportunity Reconciliation  Act of 1996, 42  U.S.C.
§ 6o4a (2ooo) (providing for charitable choice  in the provision of welfare services).
17 See  Bill  Broadway, Faith-Based Groups Benefit from New  Federal Grants, WASH.  POST,
Aug.  3,  2002,  at B9.
18  See  Dorothy  Shields,  Cartoon Helped  Show  Us  School  Voucher Problems, PANTAGRAPH
(Bloomington,  Il.), Feb.  i8,  200o,  at  A13  (commenting  on an  editorial  cartoon published  on  Feb-
ruary  11,  2001).
19  See Shymeka  L. Hunter, Note, More Than Just a Private Affair: Is  the Practice of Incarcer-
ating Alaska Prisoners in  Private Out-of-State Prisons Unconstitutional?,  17  ALASKA  L.  REV
2003] 1233
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is  fundamentally  governmental  and  should  not  be  contracted  out  to
private providers.
What may  make  a particular  function  fundamentally  public  as  op-
posed  to  private?  The question  points  potentially  to  traditional  prac-
tices,  symbolic  meanings,  or  political  theories.  Collecting  taxes  may
seem  fundamentally  public  because  historically  it has been  conducted
by agents employed  by governments, whether  monarchs  or democratic
officials.  Criminal  prosecution  may carry special  symbolism  as  a pub-
lic  rather  than  private  action.  Although  some  historical  traditions
permitted  prosecutions  initiated  by private parties,  contemporary  U.S.
practice  consolidates  prosecutorial  power  in  the  government,  with the
symbolic  message  that  the  government  stands  in  for  the  community
and  private  victims.  Some  may  view  the  task  of  running  prisons  as
importantly  public  because  the  political  system  currently  assigns  a
monopoly over  the  legitimate  use of force  to the government,  although
historical  practices  included  private prisons.  Using  private actors  may
jeopardize  the legitimacy of government action  because the public may
suspect that private profit-making  - rather than public purposes  - is
being  served.  Critics  even  suggest that  prison  privatization  produces
incentives  to  push  for  expanding  the  prison  system  and  criminaliza-
tion.20  Others  may  wonder  whether  a  profit-making  company  han-
dling  a  state's  welfare-to-work  transition  cares  more  about  moving
people  out  of welfare  in  the  short  term  than about  helping  them  find
long-term  jobs.  Whether  or  not  these  doubts  are  warranted,  the  ap-
pearance  of private  motives  in a public domain  can  undermine respect
for  government  and  even  generate  doubt  whether  the  government  is
sincerely  pursuing  public  purposes.  The  public  identity  of particular
actions  can  carry  traditional,  symbolic,  or  political  significance,  and
these  dimensions may  tacitly influence debates  expressed  in more  utili-
tarian  terms.  Similar  objections,  along  with  constitutional  concerns,
arise  when  states  permit  religious  groups  to  run  units  within  public
prisons.
2
1
The  provision  of  previously  public  services  by  religious  and  for-
profit  entities  raises  questions  about  public  participation  and the  ef-
319  (2000);  Judith  Greene,  Bailing Out Private Jails, AM.  PROSPECT, Sept.  10,  2oo,  at  23  (re-
porting  on lawsuits raising challenges and  state decisions to roll  back or rescind contracts  because
of abuses in privatized prisons).  But see  Developments, supra  note  is  (identifying strengths of for-
profit prisons).  For a historical perspective,  see White, supra note  is.
20  See  Andrew  Gumbel,  The  US Economy May Be Ailing, but with Record Inmate Numbers
To  Contend With the Prison Industry Is  Booming, INDEP. (London), Oct. 19,  2002,  at  16, available
at 2002 WL  ioi681720.
21  Samantha  M.  Shapiro,  At  Evangelical Jails,  Jesus  Saves  and  Texas  Pays  the  Bills,
FORWARD,  Sept. 6, 2002,  at i,  http://www.forward.com/issues/2oo2/o2.og.o6/newsS.html.
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fects of privatization  on  the character  of the  polity.22  The shrinking of
public  space  raises  a  related set of concerns.  When  courts uphold  the
rights  of owners  to  restrict free  speech  in shopping  malls, the  avenues
for  public expression  seem  diminished.23  Mirroring  increasing  private
ownership  of water  supplies  and distribution,  the hit Broadway  musi-
cal  Urinetown satirizes  a  world  with  no  free  public  restrooms,  where
people  have to pay to relieve themselves  (while also exposing dilemmas
of both  public  and private  resource  management).24  More  abstractly,
the settings  for public debate and deliberation  may be shrinking  as key
decisions  about schooling,  social services,  prisons,  and  health care  are
made  by  private  groups  with  public funds.  Public  control and review
- whether  through  administrative  or  political  processes  - diminish
as  previously public activities  fall under private management and con-
trol.  Access  to information  about services  and results  also decreases  if
the  information  becomes  private.  Local,  state,  and  federal  govern-
ments make numerous  but discrete  decisions:  to subcontract  social  ser-
vices  and  prison  and  school  management,  to  invite  religious  groups
into  government  programs  and  public  spaces,  to  cut  back  on  public
programs,  to promote partnerships joining venture  capital projects  and
government  goals,  to distribute public  benefits in the form  of vouchers
redeemable  at private  settings, to solicit private  underwriters  for pub-
lic  initiatives,  and  to  impose  fees  or  other  restrictions  on  programs.
Ordinary  people, if they are consulted at all, take the  role of consumers
rather  than  citizens  who  participate  in  governance  decisions  through
elected  representatives  or other public  channels.  Many  people, reflect-
ing  a  range  of constitutional,  philosophical,  and  practical  views,  con-
demn  the  use  of  public  dollars  to  finance  religious  instruction  and  to
remake the relationship  between schooling and the  polity as  well as al-
22  Secular  nonprofits seem  less  likely  to  pose  such  risks  when  they  chiefly  act to deliver ser-
vices  specified  by  the  government  or, as  is the case  with  private  educational  institutions,  serve  a
small percentage of the population.
23  See  Hudgens  v. NLRB,  424  U.S.  507,  520-21  (1976)  (holding  that  the  First  Amendment
does  not  apply  against  a privately  owned  shopping  area);  Waremart,  Inc.  v. Progressive  Cam-
paigns, Inc.,  io2  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  392,  399  (Cal.  Ct. App.  2000)  (holding  that commercial  establish-
ments  can  prohibit expressive  activity  unrelated  to  the  business enterprise).  The  Supreme  Court
did  rule that a  state can  create  under  its own  constitution  a right  of access  to  shopping  centers.
See PruneYard Shopping  Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S.  74,  88 (ig8o).  However, even  the California law
at issue  in  that case  has  been  restricted  by subsequent  state  interpretation.  See  Waremart, 102
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392  (allowing a retailer to prevent a petition  for  signatures on  a private sidewalk);
see also Stranahan  v.  Fred  Meyer, Inc.,  ii  P.d  228,  244  (Or. 2000)  (holding that  a private  shop-
ping mall owner can prevent collection  of signatures at the mall).
24  See GREG  KOTIS,  URINETOWN,  THE MUSICAL  (2002); Theater Guide, N.Y. TIMES,  June  7,
2002,  at  E5  (noting the  performance  of the  Tony-award  winning  Urinetown); see also PETER H.
GLEICK  ET  AL.,  THE  NEW  ECONOMY  OF  WATER:  THE  RISKS  AND  BENEFITS  OF
GLOBALIZATION  AND  PRIVATIZATION  OF  FRESH  WATER  (2002)  (examining  the  risks  from
global  trends  toward  transferring  production,  distribution,  or  management of  water from  public
to private hands).
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ter  the  line  between  state  and  religion.  Because  these  decisions  are
separated  in  time and space,  the  patterns of social provision  are  often
difficult to discern.  In addition, many  of the  decisions  are  made with-
out  public  notice  or  opportunities  to  participate.  With  effects  buried
under a welter of specific  decisions,  no wonder  there  is little  public de-
bate  over  the  kinds  of services  that  warrant  public  subsidy  or  provi-
sion.  In  the  meantime,  emerging  arrangements  jeopardize  public
commitments to equality, due process, and democracy.
These  shifts merit public discussion.  Yet, if we stand  back, we  can
recognize  the  changing  relations  between  public  and  private  actors  as
a new  chapter in  a long-running story of shifting  relationships  connect-
ing  public  and  private  institutions,  functions,  and  identities.  New
shifts  should  be  subject to  overarching  public  rules  and goals  govern-
ing their development.  In this light, public and  private institutions  can
and  should  be  viewed  as  partners,  serving  larger  and  multiple  public
ends.
New  uses  of  vouchers,  government  contracts,  and  public-private
ventures afford  a chance  to draw  upon the  strengths  of different socie-
tal  sectors,  to  stimulate  competition  and  innovation,  and  to  embrace
pluralism  and  tolerance  as  important  public  values.  The  persistent
failures  in  existing  forms  of social  provision  - in  schooling,  meeting
the  needs  of  poor  people,  addressing  substance  abuse,  resolving  dis-
putes, and ensuring health care - supply powerful reasons  for govern-
ment  to  work  with  the  private  forces  of for-profit,  secular  nonprofit,
and  religious  organizations.  Still, public  values,  which  themselves  re-
quire  public  deliberation,  should  guide  assessments  of  the  specific
benefits  and  limitations  of competition  and the  quality  of services  de-
livered  by  for-profit or religious  providers  in  partnership with  govern-
ment to meet basic human  needs.
Whatever the normative limitations  of the  arguments favoring pub-
lic-private  partnerships,  the trend  is undeniable.  State,  local,  and  fed-
eral  governments  are  widely  exploring  privatization.  Skeptics  should
not  simply decry this reality, but deal  with  it by demanding  public  ac-
countability.  Yet  public  accountability  raises  its  own  set  of  issues.
Voters  and leaders  should demand  public accountability that draws  on
the  best, not  the  worst, of the  accountability  practices  in the  market-
place,  in  nonprofit  organizations,  in  religious  institutions,  and  in gov-
ernment.  With  scandals  revealing defects  in  the  accountability of cor-
porations  and religious  institutions,  governments  must set and  enforce
meaningful  public  standards  for  public  services,  even  if delivered  pri-
vately.
Accordingly,  this Article  considers how  current  privatization  ef-
forts  build upon  and depart from historical  practice.  It then  considers
reasons  to  endorse  and  reasons  to  object  to  current  privatization  ef-
forts.  After  arguing  for  a  conception  of partnership - joining public
and private  efforts to meet basic human  needs - this Article  identifies
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accountability  as  the  central  issue  requiring  inventive  work  and  re-
newed  public involvement  and identity, and  offers suggestions  for pro-
moting accountability.
I.  A NEW CHAPTER IN THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE  STORY:  PROMISES
AND RISKS
In some ways, our time mirrors the early nineteenth century, with its
rising confidence  in private  initiative, voluntary action,  and religiously
inspired  responses  to  the  problems  of  neglected  children,  mentally  ill
people,  and  prisoners.  Historian  James  Willard  Hurst  argues  that
"[b]elief  in  the  release  of  private  individual  and  group  energies
...  furnished  one  of the  working  principles  which  give  the  coherence
of character  to  our  early  nineteenth-century  public  policy. ' 2 5  During
the  nineteenth century, federal, state, and  local governments  used  land
grants,  tax  exemptions,  and  corporate  and  antitrust  law  to  stimulate
private  efforts  in the  service  of  public  aims.2 6   Current  initiatives,  in
contrast, supplement  these government  efforts  with public  funds  to fi-
nance  private  initiatives  and  public-private  ventures; 2 7  yet  the  chal-
25  JAMES  WILLARD  HURST,  LAW  AND  THE  CONDITIONS  OF  FREEDOM  IN  THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY  UNITED  STATES  32  (1967).  For  a discussion  of current uses of mar-
ket mechanisms  in  governance,  see John D.  Donahue,  Market-Based Governance and the Archi-
tecture of Accountability, in  MARKET-BASED  GOVERNANCE:  SUPPLY  SIDE,  DEMAND  SIDE,
UPSIDE, AND  DOWNSIDE  i,  2-5  (John D. Donahue & Joseph  S. Nye Jr. eds.,  2002).
26  In  the  nineteenth  century, common  law  governance  at  the state  and local  levels  promoted
economic  development  and  industrialization  alongside  restrictions,  such  as  nuisance  laws,  that
sought  to  guide  private  actors  to  respect  the  public  good.  See  WILLIAM  J.  NOVAK,  THE
PEOPLE'S WELFARE:  LAW  AND REGULATION  IN  NINETEENTH-CENTURY  AMERICA  12,  22,
42  (1996)-
27  At the turn of the twenty-first  century, private-sector  actors are joining in  partnerships with
local  and  state  governments,  and  with  large  federal  government  agencies  and  initiatives  forged
during Reconstruction,  the  New  Deal,  the  Great  Society, and  subsequent  periods.  See,  e.g.,  Bill
Berkowitz,  Prospecting  Among  the Poor: Welfare Privatization  (2ooI), available at http://www.arc.
org/downloads/prospecting.pdf  (describing how  the  federal Personal  Responsibility and Work  Op-
portunity Act of  1996  allows states to set up  private delivery  systems for public welfare  funds and
services);  Ronald D. Utt, How Public-Private  Partnerships  Can Facilitate  Public School Construc-
tion  (Heritage  Found.  Backgrounder  No.  1257,  1999),  available  at  http://www.heri-
tage.org/Research/Education/Schools/BG1257es.cfm  (describing  public-private  partnerships  and
public  school  construction);  Child  Care  P'ship  Project,  at  http://www.nccic.org/ccpartnershipsl
home.htm  (last visited Feb. 9,  2003) (describing public-private  partnerships to improve child care);
Nat'l Council  for  Pub.-Private  P'ships, Factsheet, at http://ncppp.org/presskitfactsheet.html  (last
visited Feb. 9, 2003)  (describing cutting-edge  public-private  partnerships in  environmental  protec-
tion,  water  treatment,  transportation,  and  other  fields); see  also Nat'l  Council  for  Pub.-Private
P'ships, For the Good of the People: Using Public-Private  Partnerships  To Meet America's Essen-
tial Needs  (2002),  available at  http://ncppp.org/presskit/ncpppwhitepaper.pdf.  Historians  also
identify the  emergence  of governmental  appropriation,  as  well  as charters  and tax exemptions  to
private institutions, in the nineteenth  century.  HURST, supra note  25,  at 96-97;  see also id. at  79-
82,  88  (describing  the shift  toward governmental  funding  through  land grants  and utility financ-
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lenge today, just as it was in the past, is to balance  confidence in private
initiative  with  a  vision  of  public  values,  respect  for  religion  with  a
commitment to  liberty, and an  embrace  of ethnic and  religious  plural-
ism with a commitment to nourish a union.
Thus, it is not novel to ask how extensively public resources  should
be  privatized.  One  financially  strapped  municipality  in  1849  literally
sold  the  public  square  to  private  interests  - but  the  state  supreme
court  found  this  a  violation  of  public  purposes.28  When  New  York
City Mayor  Michael  Bloomberg  proposed  in  2002  to  redress  an  enor-
mous  budget crisis  by selling  naming  rights to  city parks,  he triggered
jeers  and parodies, but no  lawsuits as yet.29  Even as governmental  ac-
tivities  increasingly  addressed  the  needs  of children,  disabled  people,
and poor  people  in the nineteenth  century, philanthropic and voluntary
agencies  - today's  nonprofits  - sprung  up  and expanded.30  In  the
area  of social  services  such  as  foster  care  and  adoption,  private  agen-
cies  - many  religious  - formed  the  central  elements  of  social  re-
sponse but gradually  became  part of publicly  regulated and subsidized
systems.31  The  creation  of  private  dispute  resolution  agencies,  some
for-profit, some  religious,  in  some  way revives  traditions  of mercantile
and religious communities in the eighteenth  and nineteenth centuries.3 2
ing);  ALAN TRACHTENBERG,  THE INCORPORATION  OF AMERICA:  CULTURE  AND  SOCIETY
IN THE GILDED AGE  165  (1982).
28  See Commonwealth  v. Rush,  14  Pa. 285  (85o);  NOVAK, supra note 26,  at  146.
29  See John  Leland,  And  Now, Unveiling RCA  Battery Park, N.Y. TIMES,  Feb.  Io,  2oo2,  §  9
(Sunday  Styles), at  io (satirizing a New York world in  which  everything from cab drivers'  verbal
assaults  to traffic jams  presents  an opportunity  for corporate  endorsement);  see also Dave  Salton-
stall, Park Ads  Plan a  Sign of Tough  Times,  DAILY  NEWS,  Feb.  15,  2002,  at  20  (distinguishing
Mayor  Bloomberg's  proposal  to  sell  ads  in  city  parks  from  the  proposal  to  sell  naming  rights,
which  would  be  reserved  "for  companies  willing  to build  and maintain  large  new  complexes  for
the park system, like a new track and  field stadium").
30  See OSCAR & MARY  HANDLIN,  THE DIMENSIONS  OF LIBERTY  104 (I96I).
31  See  LINDA  GORDON,  HEROES  OF  THEIR  OWN  LIVES:  THE  POLITICS  AND  HISTORY  OF
FAMILY  VIOLENCE:  BOSTON, 188o-i96o, at 27-58 (1988).
32  Extensive  scholarship examines the  tradition of merchant arbitration and dispute resolution.
See,  e.g.,  LINDA  R.  SINGER,  SETTLING  DISPUTES:  CONFLICT  RESOLUTION  IN  BUSINESS,
FAMILIES,  AND  THE LEGAL  SYSTEM  5  (199o)  (describing private  arbitration  procedures  estab-
lished  by  merchants'  associations  and  noting  that religious  and  immigrant  groups,  ranging  from
colonial  Puritans  to twentieth-century  Jewish and Chinese  immigrants,  supported dispute  resolu-
tion outside  the  formal court structure  in  the United  States);  Sarah  Rudolph Cole,  Incentives and
Arbitration: The  Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements  Between  Em-
ployers and Employees, 64 UMKC  L. REV. 449, 46o-6I  (1996)  (explaining that, as early as  the sev-
enteenth  century, merchants  turned  to  fellow  merchants  with  knowledge  of  industry  customs,
rather than  to the courts, to  resolve  trade disputes);  Bruce  H.  Mann,  The  Formalization  of Infor-
mal Law: Arbitration  Before the American Revolution, 59  N.Y.U.  L. REV. 443,  469-73 (1984)  (not-
ing that trade  associations  established private  dispute resolution  mechanisms  early on, culminat-
ing  in  the  birth  of commercial  arbitration  under  the  auspices  of  the  New  York  Chamber  of
Commerce  in  1768);  see also JEROLD  S.  AUERBACH,  JUSTICE  WITHOUT  LAW?  44-45,  73-94
(1983).
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Nor  is  it  new  to  see  religious  organizations  in  the  business  of
schooling  and  social  welfare.  Religious  goals  animated  education  ef-
forts  in  early America.33  Religious  groups initiated  social  services  for
the  poor, the  sick, and the  disabled.34  Even ostensibly  secular  reform
efforts at the turn of the twentieth  century  had  strong religious  roots. 35
Due  to social  conventions and constitutional  interpretations,  religiously
affiliated  hospitals  and child  welfare  and  social  service  agencies  have
received  public funding  for  decades  through  contracts  and entitlement
programs  structured as insurance  or vouchers.  Usually, such organiza-
tions exist  independently  as  nonprofit organizations,  formally separate
from  places  of worship  or ritual.  Often,  observers  do not even  realize
the  religious affiliation  of many nonprofit agencies.36  But the staff and
volunteers  are  often  acting  out  of  religious  conviction  and  pursuing
practices guided  by religious teachings.
3 7
When  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt  signed  the  G.I.  Bill  into  law  in  1944
as  an  educational  entitlement  for  World  War  II  veterans, 3 8  the  gov-
ernment initiated a program that paid billions of public dollars  to both
public and  private educational institutions,  with no apparent objection
to  including  religious  schools.  In  fact, the  Conference  Committee  re-
port explained that it included the word "all"  before "public or private"
in  defining  "educational  or  training  institutions"  in  order  "to  make  it
clear  that church  and  other  schools  are  included."39  The  popular law
overcame  objections  that it was  too expensive,  would  encourage  sloth
by  veterans,  and  would  lower  standards  at  educational  institutions.
Veterans  initially  faced  unscrupulous  practices  by proprietary  schools
that promised  programs that they did not deliver  or otherwise  engaged
33 See  LAWRENCE  A.  CREMIN,  AMERICAN  EDUCATION:  THE  NATIONAL  EXPERIENCE,
1783-1876,  at 17-100  (198o).
34  See  PAUL  BOYER,  URBAN  MASSES  AND  MORAL  ORDER  IN  AMERICA,  1820-192o,  at
132-42  (1978);  ROBERT  M.  CRUNDEN,  MINISTERS  OF  REFORM:  THE  PROGRESSIVES'
ACHIEVEMENT  AND  AMERICAN  CIVILIZATION,  1889-192o,  at  40-44  (1982);  DAVID  J.
ROTHMAN,  THE DISCOVERY  OF THE  ASYLUM:  SOCIAL  ORDER IN  THE NEW  REPUBLIC  7-
I0(1971).
35  See  CRUNDEN,  supra note  34,  at  ix-x,  14-15  (arguing  that progressive  leaders  in  philan-
thropy  and  culture  were  influenced  by  their  parents'  Protestant  moral  values  and  incorporated
their  religious  beliefs  into their  efforts  to educate  and  reform  society  as  journalists,  lawyers,  and
professors).
36  See,  e.g.,  Julie  Wilson,  Long-Term  Care  in  Transition:  Does  Religious  Affiliation  Make  a
Difference?  (2002)  (unpublished  manuscript, on  file  with the  Harvard  Law  School  Library) (dis-
cussing nursing homes  with religious  orientations unknown  to outside observers).
37  Thus,  Catholic  hospitals  and  health  care  providers  resist  performing  or  even  discussing
abortion  and certain  other  reproductive services.  See MINOW, supra note *,  at  14.  Child protec-
tion  agencies  have  long tried  to  match  children  to  adoptive parents  of the  same  religion  and  in
many  parts of the  country  continue  to  do  so  today.  See  RANDALL  KENNEDY,  INTERRACIAL
INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE,  IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION  (2002).
38 See 38 U.S.C.A.  § 3011  (West 2002).
39  H.R. REP. No.  1624, at 21  (I944).
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in  fraudulent  schemes.  An  unregulated  market  yielded  unacceptable
results.  Changes  in  the law  restricted redemption  of the  G.I. benefit to
state-approved  schools  and  provided  for stricter oversight  by  the  Vet-
erans'  Administration.40   In  retrospect,  the  G.I.  Bill  is  widely  viewed
as  a sound  social  investment that delayed  the entry of returning veter-
ans into a stressed  labor market, equipped  them with better  skills, and
strengthened  higher education  through  the  infusion  of federal  aid  and
mature,  motivated  students.4 1  Many  people,  including  large  numbers
of African-Americans,  took advantage  of the Bill  and became  the  first
in their  families  to attend  college.  Since  its inception,  the  G.I. Bill has
granted  veterans  their  choice  of  educational  institution,  whether  a
trade school, public or private university or college,  or religious  institu-
tion, including seminaries devoted  to training clergy.4 2
At the turn  of the twenty-first  century, the  increasing  use  of private
organizations  to achieve  public ends reflects a number of trends: disillu-
sionment  with  government  programs,  faith  in  competition  and  con-
sumer  choice,  politicians'  desire  to  claim  to  have  diminished  govern-
ment  when  in  fact  they  have  merely  outsourced  it,  and  strategic
pressure  for  privatization  by  lobbying  groups.43   Religious  providers
continue  educational  or  social-service  activities  they started  years  be-
fore but now benefit from the government's  desire  for private partners,
subcontractors, or replacements.
44
While  continuing  some  patterns  from the past, recent privatization
efforts  depart from the  longstanding  American  practice  of partnership
between  the  public  and  private  sectors  in  four  ways.  First,  govern-
ments  now  use  direct  financing  and  joint  public-private  ventures
rather than  simply  relying  on  public  policies,  like  hospitable  antitrust
law, to  facilitate private  enterprises.  Second, precisely because  current
efforts  occur  now  - after  the  twentieth-century  buildup  of  govern-
ment institutions  and  social  provision  - new  privatization  in schools,
social  services,  prisons,  and  dispute  resolution  reverses  trends  that
many  see  as laudable  extensions  of the social  safety  net and the  ambit
of public  responsibility.  Third,  the  new  injection  of market-style  lan-
guage  and concepts  into  sectors  such as  education,  social services,  and
40  Robert  Lowe,  The  GI Bill Doesn't Vouch for Vouchers, RETHINKING  SCHOOLS,  Summer
1995, http://www.rethinkingschools.org/SpecPub/vouchers/vgibill.htm.
41  See id.
42  See  Comm.  for  Pub. Educ.  &  Religious  Liberty  v. Nyquist,  413  U.S.  756,  782  n.38  (I973)
("[O]ur decision today does not compel  ...  the conclusion that the educational assistance provisions
of the  'G.  I.  Bill'  impermissibly  advance  religion in  violation of the  Establishment Clause."  (cita-
tion omitted)).
43  See MINOW, supra  note  *, at 23-25.
44  See Barry  D.  Karl, Lo, the Poor Volunteer: An  Essay on the Relation Between History and
Myth,  58  SOC.  SERV.  REV. 493,  530-32  (1984)  (discussing the  religious  roots  of charitable  organi-
zations).
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prisons  assumes  that competition  and  choice  are  pertinent,  effective,
and better than  governance  by democratic  and constitutional values.
A  final  distinctive  feature  of recent  public-private  initiatives is  de-
liberate governmental  efforts  to  engage  houses  of  worship  themselves,
not only  their  separate  social-service  nonprofit  agencies,  in  providing
welfare,  child  care,  and  housing.4 5  Defended  in  part  as  a way  to  in-
clude  smaller, urban  (chiefly minority) denominations that do not have
separate tax-exempt social-service  agencies, efforts  to include houses  of
worship  in  public-private  partnerships  also  emphasize  that  religious
practices,  belief,  and community  - not just secular  social  services  -
may  help  people  in  trouble.  Yet  under  these  circumstances,  govern-
ment  funds  pay  directly  for  religious  practice  and  instruction  - a
striking departure  from historic constitutionally framed  practice.  With
Establishment  Clause jurisprudence  in transition,  there  is  no longer  a
Supreme  Court  majority  committed  to  keeping  public  funds  out  of
"pervasively  sectarian"  institutions. 46  American  history  scholars  may
point out that, in this shift, the Court has simply returned to the earlier
era that launched public schools as a way to teach children  to  read the
Bible.47  Yet this change in current Supreme Court views remakes some
forty years of doctrine.48  The change will startle or even  disturb many
who  thought that the fundamental constitutional  commitment  with  re-
spect  to  establishment  of religion  was  to bar  government  subsidies  of
worship and  proselytization.
49
Thus,  despite  striking  continuities,  the  new  privatization  marks
important  departures  and  generates  strong  objections.  I  will  argue
that  these  new  developments  present  both  opportunities  and  risks.
45  See MINOW, supra note *, at 68-73  (describing charitable choice  and  other faith-based  pro-
posals for  the federal  government);  see also OFFICE OF  POLICY DEV  & RESEARCH,  U.S. DEP'T
OF  Hous. & URBAN  DEV,  FAITH-BASED  ORGANIZATIONS  IN COMMUNITY  DEVELOPMENT
(2001),  available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/faithbased.pdf  (considering  the  feasi-
bility and desirability of creating federal funding opportunities  for faith-based  organizations).
46  See  Zelman  v.  Simmons-Harris,  122  S.  Ct.  2460  (2oo2)  (upholding  the  Cleveland  school
voucher program);  Good  News Club v. Milford  Cent. Sch., 533  U.S.  98 (2001)  (holding that a New
York  school  could  not  exclude  a  Christian  organization  from  its  limited  public  forum  on  the
grounds that the organization  intended to use the forum  for religious purposes); Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S.  793  (2oon)  (denying an as-applied  challenge  to a federal law that, in providing school ma-
terials and equipment, mostly benefited  religious schools).
47  See PHILIP HAMBURGER,  SEPARATION  OF CHURCH AND  STATE  220 (2002).
48  See  Noah  Feldman,  From Liberty  to Equality: The  Transformation of the Establishment
Clause, go CAL.  L. REV  673,  697  (2002)  (describing Justice  O'Connor's  1984  "endorsement test"
as "complet[ing]  a sea change" in  the  Supreme Court's  Establishment  Clause jurisprudence);  Mi-
chael  J.  Frank,  The  Evolving  Establishment  Clause Jurisprudence and School  Vouchers,  51
DEPAUL L. REV. 997,  1000-01  (2002).
49  A widespread  view  that the  Establishment  Clause  would  not allow  government aid to a re-
ligious school that advances  worship is  well expressed  in  Steven  K.  Green, Charitable Choice and
Neutrality Theory, 57  N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.  AM. L. 33  (2oo0).
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Accordingly,  the  new  privatization  deserves  collective  encouragement
but also counsels caution.
II.  REASONS TO ENDORSE CURRENT  DEVELOPMENTS
Where  public  resources  are  involved,  an  overarching  framework,
irreducibly public,  should  require  explicit oversight and accountability
to public  values  in  provision  of schooling,  social services,  prisons,  and
welfare.  Yet  insisting  on  such  public  values  does  not  require  public
monopoly  over the actual delivery  of services  or even over their design.
Indeed,  there are  four reasons  for federal, state, and  local  governments
to  explore  privatization  and  public-private  partnerships  to  generate
plural forms of social  provision.
A.  Quality and Effectiveness
First,  schooling,  social  services,  prisons,  and  welfare  provided  by
public bodies are often ineffective.  Particularly in urban  districts, many
public  schools  are  plagued  by  overcrowded  classrooms  and  under-
qualified  (even  uncertified)  teachers.  When  governments  offer  sub-
stance  abuse  programs,  foster care,  and  housing  assistance,  the  results
can range  from modestly  to severely troubling.  Legal challenges claim-
ing  violations  of  individual  rights  in  public  foster  care  systems  and
public  housing  programs  have  yielded  damage  awards  and injunctive
relief, including court-ordered  receiverships to reorganize  recalcitrant  if
not corrupt  public  systems.50  Courts  themselves  are  often  slow  and
cumbersome,  giving  rise  to  alternative  dispute  resolution  mechanisms
delivered  by  private  providers  as  well  as  within  the  public  system.s
Perceptions  of widespread  failure  in  the  welfare  system  led  to  its  re-
form  in  1996,  which  created  room  for  states  and  localities  to  work
more closely with religious and for-profit organizations.
Given  disappointment  with  failures  in  public  systems,  allowing
others  to  take  a  turn makes  sense.  In  each  instance,  parallel  experi-
ences  with  private  provision  offer  grounds  for  hope  that  private
schools,  private  social  services,  private  dispute  resolution,  and private
50  See Morgan  v. McDonough,  540  F.2d 527 (ist Cir. 1976)  (placing a public  high  school in tem-
porary  receivership  because  it  failed  to  provide  a  peaceful,  desegregated  education);  Dixon  v.
Barry, 967  F. Supp.  535  (D.D.C.  1997)  (placing the  District of Columbia's  department  of mental
health services  in temporary  receivership); LaShawn  v. Kelly, 887  F. Supp.  297  (D.D.C.  1995) (im-
posing  receivership  to ensure  the  provision  of services and  protection for  children  in  foster  care);
Perez  v. Boston  Hous. Auth., 4oo N.E.2d  1231  (Mass. ig8o) (placing the  public housing authority
in temporary receivership in  light of unsafe, indecent, and unsanitary conditions).
51  See  Milton Mollen  &  Paul  Grosswald,  Trends in  Alternative Dispute Resolution: Corporate
America Turns to the  Quicker, Cheaper Forms of Dispute Resolution, METROPOLITAN  COUNS.,
Aug.  2002,  at  6;  Frank  E.A.  Sander  &  Stephen  B.  Goldberg,  Making the Right Choice, ABA J.,
Nov. 1993,  at 66-68.
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housing  can  generate  higher  quality  and  better outcomes  with  greater
efficiency.  Private  alternatives  may  achieve higher quality than public
ones  when  they  operate  on  smaller  scales,  pursue  different  philoso-
phies,  or generate  cross-subsidies  across customers  with different  abili-
ties  to  pay.  Market-style  competition  and  incentives  also  could  im-
prove  quality  and  accountability  in  operations  that remain  public  in
form.
B.  Competition and Incentives for Improvement
A  second,  related  reason  to  favor  privatization  stems  from the  po-
tential  power  of competition,  which  creates  incentives  for  innovation
and increased  efficiency.  Competition  gives  power  to  critics  (whether
local  governments  or  ultimate  users)  who  can  threaten  to  take  their
business (whether in the form of dollars  or vouchers) elsewhere.  Com-
petition  can  also  create  pressure  to  generate  information  to  permit
comparisons  of options.
Whether  these  benefits  of  competition  work  well  outside  purely
private  markets remains  a  subject of much  academic  and political  de-
bate. 52  There  are  particular  grounds  for concern  where  the predicates
of competition  are lacking in practice.  If information  that would allow
for  informed  choice  among  options  is  not  generated,  or  if  people  are
not  free  or  able  to  choose  among  options,  the  promised  benefits  of
competition  are not likely to emerge.  The pressure for information also
elevates  measurable costs and benefits over "soft" attributes,  a tendency
that may  pressure  schools  or social services  to deviate  from  their ideal
purposes.  For  example,  schools may come  to be judged in  light of stu-
dent  scores  on  standardized  tests,  but  such  judgments  ignore  the
schools'  contributions  to  other  kinds  of  learning,5 3  to  student  aspira-
tions, and  to the  creation  of safe,  welcoming  communities  in neighbor-
hoods badly in need of such islands of hope and calm.
Yet generating demand  for at least some measures  of accountability
can  assist  informed  choices  and  also  trigger  the  development  of more
sophisticated measures  of the multiple features  of schools.  Introducing
modest incentives  and choice  programs within  an otherwise  public  op-
eration can  begin  to address  these  concerns.  Even  regulated  competi-
tion and market  mechanisms incorporated in  public systems can trigger
52  Here,  an  analogy  to  the  G.I.  Bill  is less  than  powerful,  for  the infusion  of  federal  dollars
through  that initiative  reflected  not an intention  to  improve  higher  education  but  a plan  to  give
something back to  veterans  while  easing their transition  into a difficult labor market.  See Lowe,
supra  note 40.
53 See  CAROL  ASCHER  ET  AL.,  HARD  LESSONS:  PUBLIC  SCHOOLS  AND  PRIVATIZATION
54  (1996)  (describing  a  focus on  test scores  in the  context  of a Baltimore  school  privatization  ex-
periment as "eclipsing" all other measures of teaching).
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options,  innovation,  information,  and  efficiencies  - as  demonstrated,
for example, by recent experience  with environmental regulation.
5 4
C.  Pluralism
Third,  introducing  private  options  supported  by  public  resources
can advance  pluralism.  Pluralism  means valuing the  variety of ethnic,
religious,  and  cultural  groups  within  society  and  the  virtues  of toler-
ance  and  mutual  accommodation.5 5   Pluralism  calls  upon  the  govern-
ment  and  private  actors  alike  to  respect  distinctive  groups.  In  the
United  States,  the  Constitution  has  long  been  understood  to  ensure
parents  a  variety  of  educational  options  so  that  parents  may  guide
their children  to take  on "additional obligations"5 6 alongside  those  cho-
sen  by  the  state.  Pluralism  in  social  services  may  foster  meaningful
connections  within  communities  formed  around  neighborhood,  reli-
gious,  or ethnic  identities.  Drawing  on the communal  and cultural  re-
sources  of religious groups  and of the commercial  sector  to resolve  dis-
putes  may  also  promote  less  costly  and  more  productive  resolutions.
Religious  communities  and  local groups  have  long  offered  settings  for
resolving  disputes  among  their  members.57  Analogously,  merchant
courts  and  commercial  arbitration  represent  historic  and  present-day
contributions  of  business  communities  to  dispute  resolution.  Respect
for  group  affiliations  does  not,  and  in  a  constitutional  democracy
should  not,  confine  individuals  to  any  one  group  or  prevent  groups
themselves  from shifting and influencing one another  over  time.  Some
may  want  to  elevate  groups  organized  around  religion  above  others;
others  may  want  to  elevate  groups  organized  around  language,  past
oppression,  or  other  characteristics.  But  a  vibrant  and  nontoxic
54  Government  regulation  frames the  public  effort  to  protect environmental  resources;  none-
theless,  competitive  use  of public  incentives,  predicated  on  market  ideas  such  as offsetting  and
banking, permeates  recent  regulatory  efforts.  See  Vivien  Foster  & Robert  W. Hahn,  Designing
More Efficient Markets: Lessons from  Los Angeles Smog  Control, 38 J.L. & ECON.  19,  21-25,  42
(1995).  For a  general  comparison  of traditional "command-and-control"  regulation  with  market-
based approaches  in environmental  regulations,  see Norman  W.  Spaulding  III, Commodification
and Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the Promise of Market Incentives, 16 STAN.  ENVTL.
L.J.  293 (1997).
55  For  thoughtful  discussions  of  pluralism,  see  DAVID  A.  HOLLINGER,  POSTETHNIC
AMERICA  79  (1995);  and  CAROL  WEISBROD,  EMBLEMS  OF  PLURALISM:  CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES AND  THE STATE  30, 99-1o  (2002).
56  Pierce  v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,  535 (1925)  ("The child is not the  mere creature  of the
State;  those  who  nurture him and  direct  his destiny  have the right, coupled  with the  high duty, to
recognize  and prepare  him  for  additional  obligations.").  For a fuller  analysis  of the  meaning  of
pluralism  in  this  decision,  see  Martha  Minow, Before and After  Pierce,  78  U.  DET. MERCY  L.
REV 407 (2001).
57  See  AUERBACH,  supra note  32,  at  42-46,  69,  93-94;  THE  POSSIBILITY  OF  POPULAR
JUSTICE: A  CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY  MEDIATION  IN THE UNITED  STATES  (Sally Engle
Merry  & Neal Milner eds.,  1993).
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pluralism  rejects  such  claims  of  absolute  priority,  while  treating  the
secular,  or  the  monolingual,  as  one  group  no  more  privileged  than
others.
It  makes sense for a nation as large as the United States to recognize
and  value the  capacities  of groups  smaller than  the  nation or the state
but  bigger  than  the  individual  or  the  family.  Group  affiliations  can
encourage  virtues  of  participation,  self-governance,  mutual  aid,  and
care  for others,  while allowing freedom  from  the  controlling  force  of a
powerful  government. 8  To be  nontoxic, groups  must permit individu-
als  to  exit and  to  participate  in  multiple  groups  or even  none  at  all.
Nontoxic  pluralism  also  requires  sufficiently established  and  pervasive
civic  virtues  - such  as freedom  of speech, equal opportunity  for indi-
viduals  in public  and private  settings,  and democratic participation  -
to  temper the  dangers  of prejudice,  demagoguery, and  group-based  ri-
valries or domination.
The  state committed  to pluralism  can guard  against discrimination
by groups  that  receive  government subsidies,  even  as  it ensures  space
for groups  to govern themselves.  Public  rules can  not only make  room
for  private  efforts  in educating  children,  addressing  poverty,  respond-
ing  to substance  abuse,  and rehabilitating  convicted  criminals, but can
also  support  those  private  efforts  with  tax  exemptions,  grants,  con-
tracts,  and partnerships.  Although  a  pluralist  state  can  support  some
but  not  all  possible  groups,  in  our  constitutional  democracy  the  state
must treat  groups  in  a way  that does  not discriminate  on  the basis  of
religion,  race,  nationality,  or other  group  traits  - and  does  not  pro-
mote private  discrimination  along those  lines.  For pluralism is best de-
fended  as  the  commitment  to sustain  and  nurture  the  variety  of nor-
mative  and  cultural  resources  generated  within  groups  distinct  from
the polity.
D.  New Knowledge and Infrastructure
Privatization  stimulates  new  knowledge  and  infrastructure  by
drawing  new  people  into  businesses  previously  handled  by  govern-
ment.  In  addition,  experimentation  and  institutional  innovation  can
promote learning  and participation,  in  tune with the democratic  values
of participation  and dialogue.
For all  these  reasons, it  is understandable  that local  and state  gov-
ernments,  federal  agencies,  and  legislative  committees  explore  further
opportunities  for  outsourcing  public  work,  generating  private  initia-
tives  through public  incentives,  and  promoting public-private  partner-
58  See  ROBERT  D.  PUTNAM,  BOWLING  ALONE:  THE  COLLAPSE  AND  REVIVAL  OF
AMERICAN  COMMUNITY  (2000);  Robert M.  Cover,  The Supreme Court, 1982  Term-Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative,  97 HARv  L. REV. 4,  i6  (1983).
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ships.  Governments  are  also justified  in deploying  policy tools  such as
vouchers  to link  public  ends  with  private  means.  Scholarly  observers
suggest  that old conceptions  of government policymaking  now  need to
be reshaped in light of these initiatives.59
III.  REASONS  FOR CONCERN
In  turning  to  private  actors  to  supply  education,  social  services,
dispute  resolution,  and  other  programs  to  meet  basic  human  needs,
governments  may  duck  public  obligations  and  rules,  become  too
closely  enmeshed  with  religion,  or  divert  public  resources  to  private
profits  without  gaining  the  discipline  of  a  true  economic  market.
Rather  than  achieving  increased  efficiencies  and  improved  options,
then,  the  privatization  process  risks  reduced  quality,  unequal  treat-
ment,  and  outright  corruption.  Privatized  programs  may  balkanize
communities,  produce  less  visibility  or public  access,  and  result in  less
protection  for  members  of  minority  groups.  These  issues  can  be
grouped under three headings: (a) dilution of public values, (b) potential
mismatch  between competition  and social  provision, and  (c) dangers  of
divisiveness  and loss of common institutions.
A.  Dilution of Public Values
Privatization  creates  possibilities  of weakening  or  avoiding  public
norms  that  attach,  in  the  legal  sense,  to  "state  action"  or  conduct  by
government.  Government agencies  act not only as purchasers of goods
and  services  but  also  as guarantors  of freedom  and  equality.6 0  They
can  contractually  establish  rules  against  discrimination  in  the  provi-
59  See  LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  INNOVATION:  ISSUES  AND  TRENDS  IN  PRIVATIZATION
AND MANAGED  COMPETITION (Robin  A. Johnson  & Norman  Walzer  eds.,  2000); Matthew  Dil-
ler,  The  Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules,  Discretion, and Entrepreneurial  Govern-
ment,  75  N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  1121  (2000);  Symposium,  Public Oversight of Public/Private Partner-
ships,  28  FORDHAM  URB.  L.J.  1357  (2ooi).  For  further  discussion  of  new  approaches  to
governance  in  an  era  encouraging  mixed  public  and  private  strategies,  see  Michael  C.  Dorf  &
Charles  F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,  98  COLUM.  L.  REV. 267  0998);
and  Jody  Freeman,  Collaborative Governance in  the Administrative State, 45  UCLA  L.  REV.  i
(1997).
60  Due process,  equal  protection,  freedom  of information,  and  public  participation  are  leading
public values jeopardized  by  privatization of public services.  See Diller, supra note  4,  at 503-04;
Cindy Huddleston  & Valory  Greenfield, Privatization  of TANF  in Florida:  A Cautionary Tale, 35
CLEARINGHOUSE  REV.  540, 541-45  (2002).  Altering  the  relationship  between  government  and
religion raises further  risks to the public values  of assuring individuals  free exercise of religion  and
guarding  against  government  establishment  of religion.  See  Alex J.  Luchenitser, Casting Aside
the  Constitution:  The  Trend Toward Government Funding of Religious Social Service Providers,
35  CLEARINGHOUSE  REV.  61 5  (2002).  Privatization  can  also sharply  reduce  access  to  certain
services  - such  as reproductive  health services  - if the  leading private  providers do not want to
offer  them.  See Manjusha  P. Kulkarni  et  al.,  Public Health and Private Profit: A  Witch's Brew,
35  CLEARINGHOUSE  REV. 629, 643-44  (2002).
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sion  of services.  Yet governments  can  also  work  with  private  provid-
ers indirectly by giving individuals  vouchers that they can redeem with
private providers.  If these  private providers are  unregulated, this prac-
tice  can  bypass  otherwise  applicable  public  obligations  and reporting
requirements.  The result may improve  efficiency and reduce  costs, but
it may  also vitiate  public values.  Privatization  can  undermine  a value
as  basic  as  guarding  against  the  misuse of  public  funds.  This  risk  es-
calates  when  public dollars  previously  subject to public  scrutiny move
into private accounts  closed to public  review. 61
This  risk  is especially  salient  where  the  private  providers  are  reli-
gious  institutions  and  therefore  can  claim  constitutional  protection
against  interference  with  free  exercise.  The  law  currently  excuses
houses of worship  even  from the  financial disclosure  required  of other
nonprofits  to  receive  tax-exempt  status.62   If a  church  receives  public
funding to run  a welfare-to-work  program,  it may claim  a threat to re-
ligious liberty if forced  to disclose  its financial records - although one
could make  a good case  against such  a claim  simply in terms of honest
contractual  dealing.  Moreover,  religious  providers  may  demand  the
freedom to  preserve religious  elements  of their programs  even  after re-
ceiving public aid.  A religious  provider of job counseling, for example,
could  demand  enough  latitude  to  include  prayer or  Bible  study  in  its
programs  if the  government  is not directly contracting  for  the  services
- and perhaps  even if it is.  Yet then the government might be viewed
as endorsing those religious  practices, establishing  them, or even  coerc-
ing  individuals  in dire  straits  to engage  in  religious  practice.  Indeed,
these  kinds  of risks contributed  to the development  of a jurisprudence
deploying  the  metaphor  of a "wall of separation"  between religion  and
the  state,  even  though  scholars  have cast doubt on  the match  between
that metaphor and the intention of the Constitution's  framers. 63
A thoughtful  handbook for religious organizations  serving people  in
need  shows the problems  that arise when the  boundaries between  gov-
61  See,  e.g.,  ASCHER  ET  AL.,  supra note  53,  at 54-55  (noting  that accountability  for  public
funds  proved more  difficult when  the  private  firm employed  by  Baltimore's  school  system  exer-
cised  its right to keep its financial  books closed).
62  See  I.R.C.  §§ 50i(a),  (c)(3),  7611(a),  (b) (200o);  see also Reka Potgieter  Hoff,  The Financial
Accountability of Churches  for Federal  Income Tax Purposes:  Establishment or Free Exercise?, i i
VA.  TAX REV. 71,  75-76  (iggi).
63  See  HAMBURGER,  supra note  47,  at  65-78,  89-107;  Michael  W. McConnell,  Accommoda-
tion of Religion: An  Update and a  Response to  the Critics, 6o  GEO.  WASH.  L. REV  685,  739-40
(1992)  ("The view  that religion  'undermines'  the democratic  spirit certainly  played no  part in this
country's  adoption  of  the  First Amendment.");  Michael  W. McConnell,  Coercion: The  Lost Ele-
ment of Establishment, 27  WM.  & MARY  L. REV.  933, 936-41  (1986)  ("Exponents of strict separa-
tion are  embarrassed  by the  many  breaches  in the  wall  of separation  countenanced  by those  who
adopted  the first  amendment  .... ").  See generally Michael  W.  McConnell, The  Origins and His-
torical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103  HARV.  L. REV.  1410  (199o) (providing  a
historical argument).
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ernment  and religion  blur.  When a religious  organization  augments  a
public  school system's services  by paying for guidance counselors,  who
in  turn  build  relationships  between  churches  and  children,  the  coun-
selors  must be "careful  not to proselytize. '64  When the government  not
only  makes  recordkeeping  demands  but  also  specifies  acceptable  ser-
vices  that  reflect  secular  ideas,  "[t]he  possibility  of cultural  clashes  is
high. '6 5   Yet  precisely  such  specification  - in  curricular  guidelines,
welfare-to-work  programs,  substance  abuse treatment,  or prison  social
services  - may  come  from  those  who  want  to  ensure  that  the  pro-
grams  conform  to professional  standards.  Similar demands  may come
from  others  who  oppose  the  use  of  religious  practices  in  addressing
poverty,  substance  abuse,  or  joblessness.  Although  Zelman  v.  Sim-
mons-Harris has  opened  the  door  to vouchers  redeemable  at religious
schools, 66  communities  may  be  reluctant  to  authorize  such  vouchers
when  the schools  engage  in religious  instruction  and ritual - and reli-
gious schools  may be just as reluctant  to accept public funds for fear of
constraints and oversight intrusive  to their mission.
B.  Potential  Mismatch Between Competition and Social Provision
When  governments  work  closely  with  companies  organized  to
make  profits,  they  open  avenues  for investment-based  financing,  such
as  venture  capital, that demands  an  ownership  interest.  Such  under-
takings  also risk serious  conflicts  between  public and private interests.
Voters  may  object  if  public  dollars more  visibly enhance  the  earnings
of private  investors than  they palpably improve  the  quality  of schools,
prisons,  or  housing  for  the  poor.  Public  and private  interests also  di-
verge  when  the  lack  of  a  genuinely  competitive  market  allows  for-
profit  companies  to  exact  exorbitant  prices  for their  services  or  turns
public  schools  into settings  for marketing  commercial  products  to stu-
dents.67  Some  functions  simply  seem  to  demand  public  identity.  For
64  Harold  Dean  Trulear, Faith-Based Initiatives with High-Risk  Youth,  in  SERVING  THOSE
IN  NEED:  A  HANDBOOK  FOR  MANAGING  FAITH-BASED  HUMAN  SERVICE  ORGANIZA-
TIONS  278 (Edward L. Queen Ied., 2000).
65  Edward  L. Queen  II,  Religion and the Emerging Context of Service Delivery, in  SERVING
THOSE IN NEED, supra note 64, at  18.
66  122  S.  Ct.  2460,  2465-68  (2002)  (holding  constitutional  a  school  voucher  program  whose
beneficiaries  chose overwhelmingly  to attend religious  schools).
67  See  PAUL  T.  HILL  &  ROBIN  J.  LAKE,  CHARTER  SCHOOLS  AND  ACCOUNTABILITY  IN
PUBLIC  EDUCATION  77-79  (2OO2)  (describing conflicts  between the  interests and missions  of for-
profit  management  companies  and  the  public  charter  school  boards  that  contract  with  them);
ALEX  MOLNAR,  WHAT'S  IN  A  NAME?  THE  CORPORATE  BRANDING  OF  AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS: THE  FIFTH ANNUAL  REPORT  ON  TRENDS  IN  SCHOOLHOUSE  COMMERCIALISM,
YEAR  2001-2002,  available at  http://www.asu.edu/educ/epsl/CERU/Annual%2oreports/EPSL-
0209-10 3-CERU.pdf  (examining  the  tension  between  commercialization  of  schools  and  other
educational purposes).
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example,  privatized  airport  security, exposed  as  inadequate,  generated
swift demands  for public presence and control.
Even  more  basically,  privatization  can  be  disastrous  - and  the
disasters  could demonstrate  a  profound  mismatch  between  means  and
ends. 68  The  desirability of moving  some kinds  of social provision  into
competitive  forms  of delivery depends on certain dubious  assumptions.
In  the  context  of education,  for  example,  many  advocates  for  school
choice through vouchers  or charter  schools  assume that:
"  competition  will  generate  relevant  and  comparable  information
necessary  to assess the  quality of each school;
*  parents  and  guardians  will  seek  out  the  information  necessary  to
make  informed  choices  - or a  sufficient  number  of them  will  do
so, thus signaling better choices  and better schools;
*  competition  will  allow  good schools  to  attract  students  away  from
bad  schools  - and  then  the  failing  schools  will  shut  down  or
change;
*  competition  will  generate  more  good schools  as failing schools  copy
methods from good ones or good ones expand or replicate;
"  competition  will  produce  efficiencies  through  bypassing  public  bu-
reaucracies  and therefore  will draw private  investment and improve
schooling.
Reality does  not readily support these  assumptions.  A central diffi-
culty  is  the  absence  of reliable,  comparable  information  about  schools
that are available  for selection. 69  Parents  are likely to rely on scores  on
standardized  tests and  pass  rates  on tests  mandated  by  state  and  fed-
eral  law.  Using  these  test  results  as  a  method  for  choosing  among
schools  is  problematic.  Public  and  private  schools  usually  do  not  use
comparable  tests.7 0   Even  different  public  school  systems  administer
68  See  ELLIOTT  D.  SCLAR,  YOU  DON'T  ALWAYS  GET  WHAT  YOU  PAY  FOR:  THE
ECONOMICS  OF  PRIVATIZATION  (2000)  (describing disastrous  privatization  efforts).  Fraud and
embezzlement  compound simple  failures to  deliver promised  results when  the  use  of private  con-
tractors  proves  to  be  a mistaken  means  to  achieve  public  ends.  See Jon  R.  Luoma,  Water for
Profit, MOTHER  JONES,  Nov.-Dec.  2002,  at  34,  36-37  (describing  how  a for-profit  company  in-
creased  losses  and  decreased  service  under  a contract to  manage  water  filtration and  delivery in
Atlanta).  The  mismatch  between  means  and  ends  may  also  reveal  public disputes  about  what
should  constitute public ends.  For example,  private management  of public schools  becomes espe-
cially  problematic  in light of ongoing debates  over  what really amounts to  a good education:  high
test scores or tolerance, preparation for jobs or  capacity for engaged citizenship.
69  Portions of this discussion  draw from MINOW, supra note *, at 153-56.
70  See Victoria Thorp & Jesse James, Private  vs. Public Schools: What's the Difference?, at
http://www.greatschools.netlcgi-bin/showarticle/CA/197/improve  (last  visited  Feb.  9,  2003)  ("Pri-
vate  schools can  create their  own  curriculum  and assessment systems, although  many also  choose
to use standardized  tests.").
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different tests.7"  In addition, standardized  tests are  at best crude indi-
cators of the  quality  of education  at particular  schools.7 2  Greater  reli-
ance  on  these  tests encourages  teachers  to  teach  to  the  test or  screen
students  at the  admissions  stage rather than  to deepen  student  knowl-
edge,  build citizenship  and empathy, and develop  inquiring, problem-
solving  minds - that  is,  to  educate  for  the  long  term.7 3   Developing
and  administering  more  meaningful  measures  of instructional  quality
would be costly, 7 4 especially  since these measures must undergo several
years  of evaluation  before they can  produce  reliable  assessments.75
Moreover,  even  if  adequate  information  could  be  gathered,  not all
parents  and  guardians  would  get it, understand  it,  or  act  on  it.  The
ability  and  time  necessary  to  become  an  informed  chooser  of  schools
are  not  evenly  distributed.  While  motivated  and  competent  parents
will seek  out information  (to the  extent that it exists) about the quality
71  See  U.S. DEP'T  OF  EDUC.,  STRATEGIC  PLAN  2002-2007,  available at http://www.ed.gov/
pubs/stratplan2oo2-07/stratplan2oo2-07.pdf  (describing  the  No  Child  Left  Behind  Act,  which
leaves  discretion  to  states in  adopting  standardized  assessments);  Michael  A.  Fletcher, Conferees
Agree on Education Package: Final Vote  Is Near on  Plan  for Tests, Accountability, WASH.  POST,
Dec.  12,  2001,  at Ai (describing the  variety of state testing practices before the adoption  of the No
Child Left  Behind Act of 2001,  Pub. L. No.  107-110,  I15  Stat.  1425).  For an overview  of the Act,
see  http://www.nochildleftbehind.gov/next/overview/index.html.  For  a  February  2002  report  on
states'  readiness  to  implement  the  requirements,  see  http://www.ecs.org/html/Special/ESEAI
NSLB  main.htm.
72  See  Georgann  Eubanks,  Does  Testing Make  the  Grade?, DUKE  MAG.,  July-Aug.  2001,
http://www.dukemagazine.duke.edu/dukemag/issueso7o8oi/testing.html  ("Factors  such  as  par-
ents'  educational  background,  type  of community, and  poverty  level  account  for  more  than  50
percent  of the  difference  in test scores."  (quoting Prof. Steven  Pfeiffer) (internal quotation  marks
omitted));  Barbara  Kantrowitz  & Daniel  McGinn,  When  Teachers Are  Cheaters, NEWSWEEK,
June  ig,  2ooo,  at 48,  48 ("Even the best tests are designed with  much more  modest goals.  They're
supposed  to  be  diagnostic  tools - to help  pinpoint gaps  in  learning.  They  don't provide a full
picture  of a  child's - or  a school's  - accomplishments  any  more than  a single  blood  test can
supply all the data a doctor  needs to treat a patient.").
73  See Laura Pappano, Making the Grade, BOSTON  GLOBE,  April  21,  2002,  Magazine, at  ii
("Because  doing well  on the tests  is critical,  boosting  [standardized  state test] scores - not neces-
sarily  improving  teaching  - has  become  a  goal  in  some  school  districts.");  Ben  Wildavsky, The
Question Is: Are  Tests  Failing the  Kids?, U.S.  NEWS  &  WORLD  REP.,  May  21,  2002,  at  23,  23
("[A]s more states adopt  the tests, some people  are beginning  to wonder  whether  they're truly im-
proving  instruction  - or, as -critics claim,  whether  they are  hurting  kids by  forcing  teachers  to
merely teach  to the tests.").
74  For example,  many  educators support  the  use  of portfolio  assessment  in  evaluation,  which
uses  collections of student work  rather  than standardized  tests.  Yet such  assessments  do not per-
mit quantitative  or standardized  ranking  of performance.  See  Meg Sewell  et  al.,  The  Uses  of
Portfolio Assessment in  Evaluation, at http://ag.arizona.edu/fcr/fs/cyfar/Portfo-3.htm  (last  vis-
ited Feb.  9,  2003).  Other methods,  such  as outside  examination of school performance  and multi-
faceted  measures  of success,  would  improve  accountability, see  TONY WAGNER,  MAKING  THE
GRADE:  REINVENTING  AMERICA'S  SCHOOLS  73-81  (2002),  but  also  raise  costs.  Meanwhile,
pressure  to  perform under single  statewide standards may  force schools  to abandon  rich, rigorous
curricula.  See id. at 8o.
75  See  NAT'L  COMM'N  ON  TESTING  & PUB.  POL'Y, FROM  GATEKEEPER  TO  GATEWAY:
TRANSFORMING  AMERICA  (199o).
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of programs, others will not.  Alternatively, parents  will be more influ-
enced  by matters of convenience (such as the  availability of transporta-
tion or after-school  programs) or  familiarity.  Even  in  purely commer-
cial  markets,  not  all  consumers  need  to  be  informed  choosers.
Theorists  emphasize  that enough  informed  consumers  will, by making
good decisions,  signal  to  others  who  can  free-ride  on  their investment
of time  and research  and behave  as  if they  had full  information  them-
selves.7 6   Yet  such  signaling  requires  networks  of  communication  -
and these  are  precisely  what is  jeopardized  when  informed  and  moti-
vated parents  leave  public schools  for private or  charter schools.  Even
surveys  can  be  misleading,  as  parents  may  report  satisfaction  with
their  children's  schools  without correspondingly  high  quality.77  Molly
McUsic  concludes  that "[t]he irony of the school  choice model  is that it
requires  two  components  that  are  not  in  adequate  supply:  committed
and interested  parents,  and empty desks in  high-quality  public  or pri-
vate schools."7"
If the competitive  model worked,  we  should observe  failing schools
close  and  good  schools  attract  more students  and  increase  in  number.
Yet  not all  inadequate  schools  close - and  good  schools  do  not easily
expand  or  replicate.  Inadequate  schools  often persist because  of iner-
tia  and  resistance  to change  by teachers,  unions, and  parents.  Inade-
quate  schools also  persist because  there  are not enough talented  teach-
ers  and  administrators  willing  to work  for the  salaries allotted.  Even
when failing schools do close,  the closure can be abrupt and disruptive,
forcing children to move to other inadequate  schools.
Long  waiting  lists for attractive  schools  may eventually  lead to ex-
pansion,  but  they  may  instead  lead  to  long  lists  of disappointed  stu-
dents.  Of course,  many  attractive  schools  - in  suburban  districts  -
remain  out of reach  for  families unable  to afford  the  real estate  or ex-
cluded  by zoning or  tradition.  It  is  precisely  those  students who  lack
good  choices under the  current  regime  who also may be stuck with the
76  See  Michael  Spence,  Competitive and Optimal Responses to  Signals: An  Analysis of Effi-
ciency and Distribution,  7 J.  ECON. THEORY  296 (1974).
77  See  CARNEGIE  CORPORATION  OF  N.Y.,  YEARS  OF  PROMISE:  A  COMPREHENSIVE
LEARNING  STRATEGY  FOR  AMERICA'S CHILDREN  14-22  (1996);  Lewis  D.  Solomon,  The  Role
of For-Profit Corporations  in  Revitalizing Public Education: A  Legal and Policy Analysis, 24  U.
TOL. L. REV. 883,  886-88 (993)  ("Numerous reports and  analyses conducted  during the  past dec-
ade  point  to  one  sorry  conclusion:  our schools are  not doing  their  job."); see also John  F.  White,
Who  Benefits  from  the  Milwaukee  Choice  Program, in  WHO  CHOOSES?  WHO  LOSES?:
CULTURE,  INSTITUTIONS,  AND  THE  UNEQUAL  EFFECTS  OF  SCHOOL  CHOICE  II8,  135
(Bruce  Fuller & Richard  F. Elmore  eds.,  1996) (noting the  parental satisfaction with  a Milwaukee
private  school  choice  program  despite  the  lack  of significant  improvement  in  student  perform-
ance).
78  Molly  S.  McUsic,  The  Law's Role  in  the Distribution of Education: The  Promises and Pit-
falls  of  School  Finance Litigation, in  LAW  AND  SCHOOL  REFORM:  SIX  STRATEGIES  FOR
PROMOTING  EDUCATIONAL  EQUITY 88,  122 (Jay P. Heubert ed.,  1999).
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least desirable  schools  even  if offered  choice  and competition  in urban
settings.
One  potential  solution,  increasing  the  capacity  of  good  schools,  is
especially  difficult because  small  scale and  small  class  size  are  predic-
tors of good  schooling.7 9  Indeed,  scaling  up  successful  education  from
one  school  to  an  entire  district  is  widely  cited  as  the  missing  step  in
school  reform  in  a world  in which  individual  good  schools  can emerge
even  in  failing  systems.80  In  addition,  if  start-up  charter  schools  be-
come  successful  - so  far  the  results  are  mixed8'  - they  will  divert
funds from existing  public  schools  and risk pushing them  even  further
behind. 2   Meanwhile,  the  initial  flood  of enthusiasm  for  starting  for-
profit  companies  to  run  failing  public  schools,  or  to  start  charter  or
private  schools,  has  quickly  abated  in  light of the  financial,  political,
79  See Scott  Stephens,  Teachers Union Sees Smaller Classes as Way  To Help Raise State Test
Scores, PLAIN DEALER  (Cleveland),  Apr.  14,  1999, at  iB,  available at 1999 WL  2358108  (report-
ing  that one  study  "concluded  that students  in  smaller  classes  ...  showed  immediate  academic
gains  that continued  with them  through their  school careers").  But see Cuts in  Class Size Fail To
Bolster Learning, USA  TODAY,  Aug.  2,  2002,  at  8A,  available at 2002  WL  4730952 (arguing  that
"teacher  quality, not class size,  has  the greatest  impact  on  learning").  Apart from  reducing  class
size,  many  successful  experiments  have  divided  large  schools  into  smaller  schools.  See, e.g.,  Fi-
nancing Our Future Education Improvements for the 2zst Century: Panel One: Private Contribu-
tions to Public Schools,  1998  ANN.  SURV.  AM.  L.  i8i,  19o,  available at WL  1998 ANNSAL  181
(comments of Vincent McGee) (describing one  such effort).  This  approach  was the  innovation  of
Deborah  Meier,  who  first  implemented  it  at  Central  Park  East  in  Harlem.  See  generally
DEBORAH  MEIER,  THE  POWER  OF  THEIR  IDEAS:  LESSONS  FOR AMERICA  FROM  A SMALL
SCHOOL IN HARLEM  15-38  (1995).
80  Although there are  many examples  of successful  schools  in large urban  school systems, there
are  no  examples of  entirely successful  large  urban  school  systems.  See  F. HENRY  HEALEY  &
JOSEPH  DESTEFANO,  EDUCATION  REFORM  SUPPORT.  A  FRAMEWORK  FOR  SCALING  UP
SCHOOL  REFORM:  How To  TACKLE  THE  PROBLEM  OF SCALE IN  EDUCATION  REFORM  I-
4,  12-16  (1997)  (describing the  phenomenon  of uneven school  quality within systems  and explain-
ing  obstacles to scaling  up school  reform), available at http://www.seisummit.org/Downloads/aspd/
EducReformSupport.PDF.
A  more  profound  difficulty with  scaling up  effective  schools  through school  choice  systems
is that school  choice  can increase  racial and  socioeconomic  stratification  within schools.  Helen  F.
Ladd,  School Vouchers: A  Critical View,  J.  ECON.  PERSP.,  Fall  2002,  at  3,  13.  Ladd notes  that
"[i]f peer  effects  were positive  and  linear, the gains  in achievement  for the  students who  move out
of the public  schools in search  of higher-quality peers  would be exactly offset  by the  losses to other
students,  either  those  in  the  schools  left  behind  or those  in  the  destination  schools,"  but  argues
that "asymmetry  in peer effects is quite plausible."  Id.
81  See  Scott  S.  Greenberger,  For-Profit School  Firm Falls  Short  on  Reforms,  BOSTON
GLOBE,  May  13,  2001,  at Ai  (noting that test  results have  varied  widely  across  schools  run  by
one  for-profit company); Ladd, supra note 8o,  at 17.
82  See,  e.g.,  RPP  INT'L,  CHALLENGE  AND  OPPORTUNITY:  THE  IMPACT  OF  CHARTER
SCHOOLS  ON  SCHOOL DISTRICTS  IO-Ii  (2ooi), at http:/lwww.ed.govlpubs/chartimpactldistrict
_impact.pdf (reporting that  45%  of surveyed districts  reported that charter  schools  negatively  af-
fected  their budget, 47%  reported  no impact, and 8%  reported  a positive  impact);  Scott  S.  Green-
berger, Charter  Schools' Influence Surveyed,  BOSTON GLOBE, July 8,  2OO,  at B9 (discussing the
RPP International  study).
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and  educational  failures  of  these  companies.8 3  If markets  work,  this
decline  in  enthusiasm  would  suggest  that  for-profit  schooling  compa-
nies do not.
C. Dangers of Divisiveness and Loss of Common Institutions
Absent  some  degree  of  public  supervision,  increasing  choice  and
competition  in social  provision  risks  diminishing  experiences  of  com-
monality and fomenting  tension  and distrust across  groups  already ex-
periencing  religious  or ethnic  tension.  These  risks  are most obvious in
the  context  of  schooling.  Although  the  vision  of the  common  school
was never realized  fully  in practice,  in many parts of the United States
and  in  many  decades,  public  schools  have  offered  a  common  experi-
ence and opportunities  for  young people  to learn  alongside  individuals
from many different backgrounds.  Without regulation, more  choice -
including  private  religious  options,  for-profit options,  and alternatives
serving  specialized  interests  - could  produce  self-segregation  along
the  fault  lines  of  race,  class,  gender,  religion,  disability,  and  national
origin.  As  a  result,  schools  could  exacerbate  misunderstandings
among groups  and impede  the goal of building sufficient shared points
of  reference  and  aspirations  for  a  diverse  society  to  forge  common
bonds.  Admittedly, some forms of school choice have long existed with
some  of those  effects;  those  with sufficient  resources  move  to the  sub-
urbs  or  opt  for  private  schools  even  without  a  formal  public  policy
embracing  school choice.  Yet an  explicit shift could erode  even  the as-
piration  of common  school  experiences  and  undermine  efforts  to  pro-
mote integration  across  lines of group  difference.  If schooling becomes
a  set  of disparate  activities  in  diverse  settings  without  common  pur-
pose, how can young people  be expected  to develop  any sense of collec-
tive identity or shared  goals?
These  dangers  may  not  seem  as  serious  in  the  contexts  of  social
services,  welfare-to-work  assistance,  dispute  resolution,  and  prisons.
Yet if new privatized options divide  along religious  lines,  with particu-
lar  programs  emphasizing  religious  practice  and  identity  as  part  of
their content, the delicate  balance  of  pluralism and  unity could indeed
83  See Edison Schools Dropped, BOSTON  GLOBE,  Aug.  24,  2002,  at Di  (reporting the Dallas
school board's cancellation  of its contract with Edison  Schools in  light of "disappointing  academic
performance  and  high  costs");  Greenberger, supra note 8i  (reporting that the academic  and finan-
cial  failures  of Advantage Schools  have led school systems  to declare  contractual  breaches);  Diana
B.  Henriques, A  Learning Curve for Whittle  Venture, N.Y. TIMES,  May  25,  2002,  at Ci  (discuss-
ing  financial problems  at Edison  Schools);  see also F. Howard  Nelson & Nancy Van  Meter, What
Does Private Management Offer Public Education?, ii  STAN.  L. & POL'Y  REV.  271  (2ooo)  (de-
scribing  the  limited  possibilities  of improving  efficiency  through  private  management  of  public
education,  what benefits  it can  bring, and  its track record);  id. at  283 (concluding  that "no  inde-
pendent evaluation  of student achievement  in schools managed  by companies  has shown  superior
performance,  and some independent evaluations found failure").
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be disturbed.  If courts become  places  only for  those too  poor to afford
access  to private dispute  resolution  options that the participants  them-
selves  shape  and  control,  then  the  perception  and  practice  of  public
justice for all will face  profound challenge.
Indeed,  privatizing  social  provision  jeopardizes  individuals'  abili-
ties  to  imagine  and  participate  in  a  public  realm.  As  basic  human
needs  are met increasingly  through relationships  of sale and  consump-
tion,  even  with  vouchers  funded  collectively, individuals  lose  chances
to  take  part  in  communities;  to  act  like  citizens  concerned  with  the
welfare  of others; and  to identify with, care about, or even  know about
collective  efforts funded  by taxes, vouchers,  and government contracts.
Some  observers  may  rejoice  at  the  prospect  of diminishing  collective
will  and  shrinking  popular  support for government  that these  lost ex-
periences  of community  participation  can  produce.  But  this  prospect
of an  increasingly  atomized  society, with  minimal  sense  of communal
good,  would  not  result  from  a  democratic  decision  to  embrace  liber-
tarianism  as  a  guiding  philosophy.  Many  Americans  may  instead
wonder  how  privatization,  which  promised  more  efficient,  cost-
effective,  and innovative  uses of public resources  to  meet basic  needs,
instead came to divide communities into groups  marked by religious  or
other  traits  that  take  on  greater  salience  than  the  national  identity.
They  may start to  wonder  how  their society  became  composed  of pri-
vate  consumers  rather  than  engaged  citizens. 84  With  the  accretion  of
numerous  discrete  privatization  decisions  and  the  prospect  of dimin-
ished  collective  will or interest in the  public  good,  will there  even  be a
public  forum  to  ask or  discuss  whatever  happened  to  public  commit-
ments  to meet basic  human  needs,  redress  inequalities,  and strengthen
democracy?
Each  of these  concerns  arises  as  governments  blur the  borders  be-
tween public  and private,  secular  and religious, and nonprofit and for-
profit enterprises.  Yet these  borders  were never sharp.  Moreover,  col-
laborations  continue to offer potential benefits,  and it remains  possible
to  conceive  of  partnerships  that  respect  the  distinctive  missions  and
84  The  authors  of a  recent study  of charter  schools describe  the  risk  that private  choice  ap-
proaches  can turn a public  good,  like schooling,  into a commodity  valued in terms  of client  satis-
faction  rather than  in  terms of service to  public  purposes.  By offering charters,  states invite  pri-
vate  groups  to initiate  new  schools  that receive  public funding;  the  states thereby  hope to  create
competition  and  innovation  within  the  public  system  through  public-private  partnerships.  Paul
Hill and  Robin Lake  write  that intense  debate  over charter schools  reflects  a disagreement  over
whether those  running these  schools "are  responsible only  to adhere  to professional  standards  and
maintain  a clientele of satisfied  parents" or instead  are responsible  "to show  government and the
general  public  that their children  are  learning  what they  need  to become  responsible,  productive
citizens."  PAUL  T.  HILL  &  ROBIN J.  LAKE,  CHARTER  SCHOOLS  AND  ACCOUNTABILITY  IN
PUBLIC EDUCATION  I  (2002).
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methods  of government  and  private  actors,  whether  religious  or secu-
lar, nonprofit or for-profit.
IV.  THE ARGUMENT  FOR PARTNERSHIP
These risks  and  possibilities  are  real.  Yet more  enduring than the
recent debate over new forms of privatization  is the long tradition of in-
tertwining public  and private  action  to  meet basic  social  needs.  Reli-
gious  and voluntary  organizations  existed  before  any current  national
government,  but today  they  operate  within  a  framework  of laws that
both  facilitate  their  involvement  and  constrain  their  actions.  In  the
United  States,  ostensibly  private  groups,  including  secular  and  reli-
gious  nonprofits,  religious  congregations,  and  for-profit  companies,  all
operate under public rules enabling and shaping  their existence.
Tax  exemptions for charitable  nonprofits  are  one  of the most obvi-
ous forms of public facilitation  of private action. 8 5  Commentators jus-
tify charitable exemptions from income,  property, and sales taxes on the
grounds that the exempt organizations  serve valuable  public  functions
and  thus  deserve  to  be  exempted  from  taxation  designed  for  private
profit-making  activities.8 6  The  same  point  can  be made,  however, by
framing  the  tax  exemption  as  a  subsidy  designed  to  create  incentives
for  private  actors  to  fulfill those  functions.  The  relationship  between
the  government and tax-exempt  organizations  can  be  understood  as  a
partnership,  a  mutually  beneficial  arrangement  to  advance  shared
purposes.
Tax  exemptions  sit  on  a  continuum  of  relationships  between  gov-
ernment  and  private  groups.87  On  one end  of the continuum  sit gov-
ernment prohibitions  such as criminal laws.  Moving  toward the center
is  government permission  for  a group to proceed.  Next  to that  is gov-
ernment  encouragement  through  charter  or incorporation,  offering  in-
dividual  participants  protections against liability for  the conduct of the
85  See  Evelyn  Brody, The Legal Framework for Nonprofit Organizations,  in  THE  NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK  I3 (Walter W. Powell ed., 2d ed. forthcoming 2003).
86  See  John  D.  Colombo,  Why  Is  Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemp-
tionfor  Private Educational Institutions),  35  ARiz.  L. REV. 841  (1993); John M.  Strefeler & Leslie
T. Miller, Exempt Organizations:  A  Study of Their Nature and the Applicability of the Unrelated
Business Income Tax,  12  AKRON TAXJ. 223,  229-30 (1996).
87  The  metaphor  of a  continuum  inevitably  flattens to  one  dimension  the  potential  points  of
comparison and  here collapses  the different meanings of public  and private  into one line.  A fuller
but more complicated  analysis would  pursue many dimensions, such  as  sources of funding,  struc-
ture of operations,  and perceived or proclaimed  identity.  A  richer analysis also  would  distinguish
religious  and  secular  as well  as for-profit  and  nonprofit  characteristics  of  the  institutions  or ac-
tions under view.
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group.88  Further  along  the  continuum  lies  indirect  government  sub-
sidy through exemptions,  deductions,  or credits, either  to the  organiza-
tions themselves89  or to their contributors. 9 0  These  policies  give a pub-
lic  boost  to  the  organization  even  while  letting  private  individuals
decide  whether  to  contribute.  Next  comes  more  direct  government
support, in  which  the  government  approves  the  organization  as  a re-
cipient  of  vouchers  redeemable  for particular  services.  Even  though
individuals  choose  whether  to redeem  the vouchers  at a particular  or-
ganization,  the government  has preapproved  the  particular  redeeming
organization  for that purpose.  For  example,  the government  must ap-
prove  which  schools  are  eligible  for school  vouchers.  Further  on  the
continuum  lie  government  contracts  with  private  entities  for  service
provision.  Even  closer  governmental  control  comes  next,  in the  form
of partnerships that give  both  government and a  private actor  govern-
ance,  performance,  or ownership  roles.  Next come  publicly chartered
entities,  like the  Red  Cross  and the  Boy Scouts.  Nearly  at  the  end of
the  continuum,  beyond  the  bounds  of constitutionality  in  the  United
States,  sits  government  establishment  of  private  religious  institutions,
political  parties, and labor unions.
The continuum represents the relationship  of the government to pri-
vate  groups.  The  government  may  forbid,  permit,  encourage,  subsi-
dize,  or establish  private entities.  Another  conceptual map reflects  the
perspective  of private  groups and  locates  government  as  either a close
presence  or a distant  authority to  be tolerated  and avoided.  From the
vantage  point  of, for example,  a religious group  that retains the  power
to relocate  to another nation  should governmental  intrusions  prove too
onerous,  any  particular secular  government  is  simply to be assessed  as
friend or foe  in light of a more eternal  project.91
88  See,  e.g.,  DEL. CODE  ANN.  tit. 6,  §  18-303  (1999) (providing  that members  or managers  of a
limited liability company (LLC) shall not be  responsible for the company's obligations to third par-
ties).
89  See I.R.C. § 501(c)  (West  2002) (listing  the requirements  to qualify  as a tax-exempt organiza-
tion under the federal income  tax code).
90  See, e.g.,  I.R.C.  § 170  (West 2002)  (providing a deduction  for contributions to  charitable  or-
ganizations).
91  See  Wisconsin  v.  Yoder, 4o6  U.S.  205,  218  &  n.9  (1972)  (noting that,  absent  First Amend-
ment protection,  the  Amish  would  be  left with  a  choice  between  abandoning  belief and forced
migration);  Brief  for  Respondents  at  26-27,  Yoder  (No.  70-Iio),  reprinted in  71  LANDMARK
BRIEFS  AND  ARGUMENTS  OF  THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  591,  620-21  (Philip  B.  Kurland  & Gerhard  Casper eds.,  1975)  (discuss-
ing  how  Amish  families  have  responded  to  failures  of  legal  accommodation  for  their  religious
practices  by leaving  the  state  or country).  Libertarians  might prefer  still another map,  in  which
government's  role  is  limited  to  enforcing  contracts,  providing  police,  and  ensuring  national  de-
fense  - but the historical practices in this country depart too dramatically from this conception to
make it of much practical  use for current analytic purposes.
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Governments  can  also  act  as  the  ultimate  provider;  in  so  doing,
they can  use market methods and tools.  They  can back bond issues to
finance construction  of housing and schools  pursued by private  owners
or nonprofit entities.  Private for-profit and nonprofit hospitals  depend
on  public as  well  as  private insurance  payments  and research  funding.
Government  and  private  entities  collaborate,  commingle,  and  coexist
in extensive, complex  ways.  By mixing public  and private  finance  and
deploying  government  policies  to encourage  and  shape private  supply,
public  and  private  partnerships  can  use  market  mechanisms  while
pursuing publicly defined aims.
Private  for-profit  and  nonprofit  enterprises  supply  goods  and  ser-
vices  that address  needs  identified  and subsidized  by the government.
When government providers exist alongside private ones,  they compete
for  government  dollars  or  for  enrollment  or  election  by  private  indi-
viduals.  Yet  public  and  private  schools,  social  services,  prison  pro-
grams,  and  subsidized  housing  efforts  should  also  be  understood  as
partners.  From  the  perspective  of people  with  needs  - children  to
educate,  housing  crises,  joblessness,  alcoholism  or  drug  abuse  - reli-
gious  and  secular  nonprofit  organizations  exist  alongside  for-profit
companies  and  governments  as  potential  resources.  Both  kinds  of en-
tities  do,  or should,  abide  by the  same  basic  rules  and  do,  or  should,
pursue  overlapping,  if not identical,  purposes.9 2  Yet  determining and
enforcing  those  basic  rules remains  centrally  a  public task,  to be  pur-
sued  according  to democratic  means and purposes  even  while  seeking
efficiencies.
At  best,  maintaining  avenues  for  innovation  and  effort  through
each  of these  channels  ensures competition  and  pluralistic approaches
for  educating  young  people,  addressing  the  needs  of  impoverished  or
substance-abusing  people,  or  meeting  other  social  needs.  At  worst,
however, the  mix of public  and private  efforts  produces  gaps  and fail-
ures  that  leave  many  without  effective  education  or  services,  and
without an obvious avenue  to redress the failures of each  system.  Evi-
dence  of such gaps  and failures is plentiful.  The disparity  between the
quality  of  good  schools,  whether  public  or  private,  for  suburban
children  and  comparable  opportunities  for  urban  children  is  well
documented.93  Waiting lists for subsidized  housing  are only one meas-
92  People  running a faith-based initiative can agree to abide  by the same commitments  as secu-
lar providers  of social services - including steering  clear  of pressure  to engage  in  religious prac-
tices  and making sure  that secular  alternatives  are  available  for participants.  A study of the  na-
tional faith-based  initiative  for high-risk youth  reports that participating  agencies  understood and
abided  by  these  commitments.  See  ALVIA  Y.  BRANCH,  FAITH  AND  ACTION:
IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  NATIONAL  FAITH-BASED  INITIATIVE  FOR  HIGH-RISK  YOUTH
45-66 (2002), available at http://www.ppv.org/pdffiles/faithandaction.pdf.
93  See  generally JONATHAN  KOZOL,  SAVAGE  INEQUALITIES:  CHILDREN  IN  AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (1991).
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ure  of the  unmet need  for  shelter;  another  is  the  rising  rate  of home-
lessness.94   Waiting  lists  for  alcohol  and  drug  treatment  programs,
overburdened  social  workers  helping  people  move  from  welfare  to
work,  and children  in  foster care  placements  waiting for help for their
families  or for  new,  permanent  families  offer  further  evidence  of  the
scope  of unmet social  needs.  These failures  should inspire deep humil-
ity and a strong reluctance  to reject, without specific analysis,  any new
initiative that could improve  social  services, schooling,  and housing for
poor  and working-class  people.  New  and better  answers  might  come
from venturecapitalists,  entrepreneurial  nonprofit organizers,  religious
leaders, or religious  congregations,  and the  problems are big enough  to
call  for  solutions not only by government but  also by the  sectors  these
people  represent.
The  argument  for  conceiving  of the  public  and  private  sectors  as
partners  resists any  suggestion  of merging public and  private.  Preser-
vation  of a  private  realm  is  crucial  to  the  objectives  of  pluralism  and
competition  that justify such  partnerships.  Yet assessing the combined
effects of public and private initiatives  warrants  a system  that permits
and  sustains  both.  By  standing  back  to  analyze  the  combined  effects
of public  and private  initiatives, evaluators - both public and private
- can  strengthen  the overarching  rules and incentives  governing  not
only  each  sector  but  also  the  relationships  between  them.  In  this
sense,  often  rivalrous,  competitive,  or parallel  efforts  may follow  their
own  courses  while  abiding  by  overarching  rules  against  fraud  or  de-
ception,  anticompetitive  behavior,  illicit  discrimination,  and  violation
of the religious freedoms of individual participants. 9 5
94  Public  housing waiting lists can require  applicants to wait as long as  two years.  See Otto J.
Hetzel, Asserted Federal Devolution of Public Housing Policy and Administration:  Myth or Real-
ity,  3 WASH.  U. J.L. & POL'Y 415,  423  (2000) ("Families wait an average[] of 13  months on [public
housing agency] waiting  lists for  units.").  On homelessness rates, see  H.R. REP. No.  101-395,  at 25
(199o);  NAT'L  COALITION  FOR  HOMELESS,  How  MANY  PEOPLE  EXPERIENCE
HOMELESSNESS?  (Fact Sheet No.  2,  1999), at http://nch.ari.net/numbers.html.
95 The complex relationships  between public and private should not be understated.  The pub-
lic  defines  the  line between  them;  the  private  generates  values,  models,  and  competition  altering
the public,  and  the broader  notion of public - the  people  - shape and are  shaped by the  result-
ing interaction.  The enterprise that still carries  the name  of "public  broadcasting" illustrates some
of this complexity.  Under old conditions of scarcity, public broadcasting emerged  to provide radio
and television programming without commercial  advertising and  with the intention of serving the
public  interest.  See  NEWTON  N.  MINOW  &  CRAIG  L.  LAMAY,  ABANDONED  IN  THE
WASTELAND:  CHILDREN,  TELEVISION,  AND  THE  FIRST AMENDMENT  (1995).  The  "public
interest,"  though  notoriously  ambiguous,  meant  something sufficiently different  from commercial
broadcasting  to inspire  public  broadcasters to include  educational  and cultural programming,  in-
cluding noncommercial  children's  programming,  absent elsewhere  in the  mass media, and to  cre-
ate  opportunities  for  citizen  commentaries.  Chronically underfunded,  public  broadcasting  in  the
United States differs  from its counterparts  in  Britain, Japan,  and Canada,  and often imports pro-
grams developed  in these  countries.  Public broadcasts  also permit  commercial  interests  to act as
sponsors and to receive  on-air identifications  that increasingly resemble  commercials.
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That private providers view themselves  as marketplace  competitors
with  one  another  or  with  government  providers  should  not  obscure
this broader  understanding  of shared purposes.  Just as  adversaries  in
dispute  resolution,  teams  in  competitive  sport,  or  even  separate
branches  of  government  often  work  in  immediate  rivalry  and tension
but  over  the  long  term  maintain  collaborative  enterprises,  so  too  do
private  and  public  schools,  for-profit  prisons  and government  prisons,
religious  social  services  and  secular  social  services.  The  law  should
promote effective  results, efficient  use  of resources, and the  benefits  of
competition  and  pluralism.  But  the  official  rules  of the  game  must
also  ensure  compliance  with  public  values  of  fairness,  equality, and
neutrality.  Of  course,  these  are  complex  demands,  and  striking  the
perfect  balance  between  competition  and  regulation  may  be  elusive.
Yet to  seek the  good  as well  as  the  best, balance  there must  be.  That
balance  can  be  achieved  only  by  demanding  and  instituting measures
of public accountability when  governments privatize social provision.
V.  THE CHALLENGE  OF PUBLIC  ACCOUNTABILITY
The  urgent question  posed  by  a shifting  mix of public  and private
providers  of  education,  welfare,  and  prison  services  is  how  to  ensure
genuine  and  ongoing  accountability  to  the  public. 96  Privatization  of
public  services  soared  precisely  when  major  corporations  engaged  in
unfettered  private  self-dealing  and  one  major  religious  group  reeled
One  of the  most successful  public  television  producers  in terms of both quality and  financial
stability is the Children's Television  Workshop.  It  supports  itself with profits from sales of videos,
toys, and other products related to its popular shows, such as Sesame Street.  See Don Aucoin,  On
a  Wing and a  Prayer."  Are Big Bird's Colleagues at PBS in  Danger of Becoming Roadkill  on the
Information Superhighway?,  BOSTON  GLOBE,  Feb.  27,  2000,  at  Ei,  available at  2000  WL
3315822.  The  success  of the  Children's  Television  Workshop  has  convinced  commercial  broad-
casters  to pursue  similar shows and  even  to contract with it.  Yet many families  cannot afford ca-
ble  service and  thus are  shut out of the  improved quality of commercial  telecommunications  gen-
erated  by public investments.  Meanwhile,  changing technologies,  including  cable, raise  questions
about  the  initial  scarcity  justifications  for  public  broadcasting.  Yet  public  rules  govern  cable
franchises  and  new  auctions  of the  spectrum.  The  interconnections  between  public  and  private
have grown increasingly  elaborate, but neither element has disappeared.
96  One  thorough  discussion  identifies  three  traditional  meanings  of accountability:  "account-
ability  for  finances,  accountability  for  fairness, or accountability  for  performance."  ROBERT  D.
BEHN,  RETHINKING  DEMOcRATIC  ACCOUNTABILITY  6  (2001).  Yet new  public management
also  requires  democratic political  accountability,  meaning satisfying  citizens'  concerns  about fair-
ness,  equality, and  other  matters.  Id.  at 33-35.  Perhaps  paradoxically,  Behn  argues  that  in-
creased  accountability  in  all these senses  can  require giving  greater  discretion  to  public officials.
Id.  at  ioo-oi.  Accountability  could  take the form of agreements  with mutual  obligations, such as
performance  contracts  that outline  specific  expected  results but ensure flexibility  in  methods.  Id.
at  122-25.  The  discussion  of accountability  pursued  here  follows  the spirit  of these suggestions
while giving greater emphasis  to the role of the public in defining the  criteria for success.
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from  scandals,  cover-ups,  and mounting  distrust  among  the  faithful. 97
This coincidence  in timing should  be all the reminder  anyone needs  of
the vital role of public oversight and checks and balances.
Accountability  in  this  sense  means  being  answerable  to  authority
that  can  mandate  desirable  conduct  and  sanction  conduct  that
breaches  identified  obligations.  In a democracy,  the ultimate  authority
should  be  the  general  population,  organized  as  voters  and  served  by
elected  representatives,  attorneys  general,  school  boards,  and  tax  en-
forcement  agencies.  To  satisfy  the  basic  requirement  of  public  over-
sight, government  bodies that  use private  means to fulfill their  obliga-
tions  should  evaluate  those  private  means  and  report  on  and  take
responsibility for  the  results.  Thus, a  government  that  contracts  with
a  corporation  to  run  a  prison  or  that  permits  redemption  of  welfare
vouchers  through a  religious  charity should  be  held  responsible  for  the
consequences  resulting from such contracts.
Seeking  accountability  through  such  measures  does  not  mean  sim-
ply resisting  privatization  by retaining  existing  methods of public  con-
trol.  The potentially enormous variety  of current methods for combin-
ing public and private energies  to  meet basic  human  needs  offers great
possibilities  for  more  resources,  better  employed.  Yet  without  proc-
esses  for  defining  goals  and assessing experiments  against  those  goals,
the  larger  society  has  little  chance  of learning  what  works  and  what
does  not.  More  profoundly,  without  public  involvement  and  public
reporting  on  the  results  of various  public-private  ventures,  democracy
is itself in jeopardy.  Self-government  will not retain  meaning if major
decisions  about  public  resources  and  the  shape  of collective  experi-
ences  occur without the  knowledge  or participation  of the nation's citi-
zens.
In  the  domains  of  education,  health,  dispute  resolution,  prisons,
and social  services,  the  measures  of accountability  must  involve  more
than  keeping  honest books  and  delivering what  is promised,  although
97  An  initial  corporate  scandal  emerged  as  faulty accounting  practices  and off-the-books  part-
nerships destroyed the  seemingly successful Enron Corporation.  See  David Barboza,  From Enron
Fast Track  to Total Derailment, N.Y. TIMES,  Oct.  3,  2002,  at  CI;  Kurt  Eichenwald,  Ex-Enron
Official Admits Payments to Finance Chief, N.Y. TIMES,  Aug.  22,  2002,  at Ai.  Another  corporate
scandal  pushed WorldCom into  bankruptcy and generated  criminal prosecutions  of its  former  of-
ficials  for fraud.  See Kurt Eichenwald,  2 Ex-Officials at  WorldCom Are Charged in  Huge Fraud,
N.Y.  TIMES,  Aug.  2,  2002,  at AI;  Simon  Romero  &  Riva  D.  Atlas,  WorldCom Files for Bank-
ruptcy; Largest U.S.  Case, N.Y.  TIMES,  July  22,  2002,  at A2;  Simon  Romero  &  Alex  Berenson,
WorldCom Says It  Hid Expenses, Inflating Cash Flow $3.8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, June  26,  2002,  at
Ai.  These  developments  offered  a  brief  reprieve  from  the  media's  attention  to  the  Catholic
Church,  which  faced  charges  of covering  up sexual  abuse  of  children  by  priests.  See  Pam  Bel-
luck,  Boston Archdiocese Protected Priest Long Linked  to Abuse,  N.Y. TIMES,  Apr. 9,  2002,  at
A22;  Fox  Butterfield  with Jenny  Hontz, A  Priest's  2 Faces: Protector,  Predator,  N.Y. TIMES, May
19,  2002,  at  Ai; Laura  Goodstein &  Alessandra  Stanley, As  Scandal Keeps  Growing, Church and
Its Faithful Reel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.  17,  2002,  at Ai.
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that is  already a tall order.  Publicly subsidized  schooling,  health  care,
welfare,  and  social services  must also  advance  public values,  which  in
turn must be the product  of collective  deliberation  and mutual persua-
sion  over time.  The historical  evolution  of American  democracy  has
yielded  vital  principles that  should provide  guidance  in the  future:  as-
surance  of  individual  freedom  of  belief and  expression,  governmental
neutrality toward  religion,  the  primacy  of the  rule of law  through  op-
portunities  for  fair hearings  by impartial  decisionmakers,  and freedom
from  exclusion  or  inferior  treatment  on  the basis  of race, national  ori-
gin,  ethnicity, language,  gender, disability,  religion,  and,  increasingly,
sexual orientation.
Under  existing  law,  a  school  voucher  plan,  for  example,  must  not
involve  any school that excludes  students  on the  basis of race, religion,
national  origin,  or  ethnicity.98  Additionally,  if concerns  based  on  re-
sources,  expertise,  or philosophy lead  some  schools  to exclude  students
on  the  basis  of  gender, disability,  or  language,  public  values  demand
that the governing  school voucher plan offer comparable  opportunities
for  such  excluded  students  at  other  schools.  Similarly,  a  state  can
work  with religious  providers of welfare and social services  only if the
providers,  like  the  state  itself,  refrain  from  violating  state  and  local
antidiscrimination  employment  law  and  strive  to ensure  participants'
freedom  of  religion  and  expression.  Thus,  two  different  approaches
may  make  sense.  One  would  ensure  enough  choice  among  providers
so  that potentially  conflicting  public  values - opposing discrimination
and  ensuring  free  exercise  of religion  - can  both  persist.  The  other
would extend public norms to each  provider that receives direct public
support.99  A for-profit  or religious  provider can  work  to provide  cor-
rections  facilities but not to bypass due process.  Contract and voucher
plans  must  have  these  public  strings  attached  and  enforced  through
adequate  oversight  and  monitoring.  At  the  same  time,  the  public
value  mandating  the  protection  of freedom  to  exercise  religion  should
also  guard  against  the  degree  of intrusiveness  into  religious  practices
within  institutions  that  would jeopardize  avenues  for  religious expres-
sion.  This  principle  would  allow  a religious  group  to  discriminate  on
the  basis  of religion, and  even  receive a tax exemption  - but not per-
form a public contract to deliver  social services.
This  nation,  as  reflected  in  its  constitution  and  laws,  embraces
complex  and  multiple  social values:  freedom  and community, abstract
equality and  religious diversity, and individual  and communal respon-
sibility.  These  values  compete,  but  they  also  hinge  on  one  another.
98  Martha  Minow,  Parents, Partners, and Choice: Constitutional Dimensions of School Op-
tions, in SCHOOL CHOICE: THE MORAL DEBATE  (Alan Wolfe ed.,  forthcoming  2003).
99  For further discussion,  see MINOW, supra note  *, at 5o-12o.
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Individual  freedom relies  on collective  rules and institutions.  Religious
pluralism  depends  on  overarching  laws  that  mandate  tolerance  and
also  limit  the  government's  involvement  and  support.  To  promote
such  complex  values,  we  need  democratic  debate  over  how  to protect
both the independence  and interdependence  of individuals.
We  need  to  improve  schools,  welfare,  health  care,  dispute  resolu-
tion,  and  corrections.  Competition  and  plural  approaches  can  help,
but not without the  larger public  framework devoted  to ensuring indi-
vidual  freedoms  and mutual respect.  Making  the new  experiments  ac-
countable  to  a  diverse  public  should  be  the  central  and  unrelenting
demand  of citizens and political leaders.
With  social  services,  including  welfare-to-work  transition  assis-
tance,  substance-abuse  treatment,  and  foster  care  for  children,  ac-
countability  becomes  especially  important  but  also  recalcitrant,  be-
cause those  most directly  affected by the services  or failures  to provide
services  are  politically  and  economically  ineffectual.  Treatment  of
vulnerable  populations  simply  does not work  well  in markets  that de-
pend  upon  consumer  rationality  or  upon  political  processes  that
demand  active  citizen  monitoring.1 00  Nor  does paternalistic  provision
of services  by  nonprofits guarantee good  practices,  as abuses  in institu-
tional  settings demonstrate. 1 01  A  mixed  system  of public  and  private
provision  with  incentives  for  competition,  disclosure  of processes  and
results,  and  public  standards  open  to  revision  in  light  of improving
practices  could  increase  accountability, but  might also degenerate  into
the worst features of the separate  for-profit, nonprofit, and  governmen-
tal programs.  Rigid standards  could force  private providers  to behave
like  government and  lose  their potential for innovation,  efficiency, and
flexibility.  Yet ineffective  public standards could leave  the terrain open
for profiteering  or for  skimming the  eligible  populations  to  serve  only
the  least  needy.  Rather  than  trumpeting  privatization  or  marching
against  it,  scholars  and  activists  should  demand  closer  study  of  the
strengths  and  weaknesses  of existing  accountability  mechanisms  that
govern  private  markets,  governmental  bodies, and  nonprofits,  as  well
100  See Susan Rose-Ackerman,  Social Services and the Market, 83  COLUM.  L. REV. 1405,  14o6
(1983).
101  See ALEXIA  PARKS,  AN  AMERICAN  GULAG:  SECRET  P.O.W.  CAMPS  FOR  TEENS  (2000)
(documenting  abusive  practices  in  private lock-up  facilities  for  juveniles);  6o Minutes II: Three-
Year  Nightmare (CBS  television  broadcast,  Jan.  2,  2oi), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2001/0I/02/6oII/main26o849.shtml.  For a  more  general  treatment  of the  risks  of unregu-
lated  benevolence,  see  WILLARD  GAYLIN  ET  AL.,  DOING  GOOD:  THE  LIMITS  OF
BENEVOLENCE  (1978).  See  also  ROBERT  WHITAKER,  MAD  IN  AMERICA:  BAD  SCIENCE,
BAD  MEDICINE,  AND  THE  ENDURING  MISTREATMENT  OF  THE  MENTALLY  ILL  261-65
(2002)  (attributing at least  some  of the  unsatisfactory  outcomes  in  clinical  treatment  of persons
with mental illness to profit-seeking  institutional activities).
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as of the  new opportunities and dangers  posed  by  collaborations  across
these sectors.
VI.  ESTABLISHED  EXPECTATIONS AND  CURRENT  BREACHES
Differences  in  both  language  and  practice  characterize  the  treat-
ments  of  accountability  in  the  spheres  of  government,  markets,  and
nonprofits, including  religious  groups.  Democratic governments  prom-
ise accountability  through  transparency,  a  trendy  term  for  public  dis-
closure  of key  decisions  and the  information  necessary  to  assess  those
decisions.  Through  public  debate,  enabled  by  legislatures,  city  coun-
cils,  public  hearings,  and  mass  media,  an  open  democracy  ensures
freedom  of expression  and  latitude  for  reporting.  Through  the  elec-
toral  sanction,  which  enables  voters  to  express  their approval  or dis-
approval  of  the  behavior  of  elected  officials,  a  democracy  creates
timely  cycles  for  public  accountability.  In  addition,  the  division  of
governmental  powers  among  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial
branches  and among federal,  state,  and  local  governments  creates  op-
portunities for one sector  of the government  to check  another.  102
Private  economic  markets  generate  accountability  through  the  op-
eration  of supply  and demand, which  tests the  viability of ideas, prod-
ucts,  and  processes  by their ability to  attract and  maintain a  sufficient
number  of  purchasers  to  meet  costs  and  generate  desirable  profits.
Many firms are  held accountable  through the  operation of capital mar-
kets,  and will  only  receive  enough funding  from investors  if they  meet
investors'  disclosure  and  performance  expectations.  Publicly  traded
companies  face additional  accountability requirements,  such as satisfy-
ing  their  boards,  including  independent  directors  in  certain  board
functions,  and  meeting  the  disclosure  requirements  mandated  by
government agencies.
0 3  In a regulated  economy, for-profit  companies
also  face  enforcement  of  public  laws  guarding  against  monopolistic
behavior,  mistreatment  of  consumers,  and  excessive  externalities
affecting the physical environment  or other domains.
Nonprofits  must report to  boards  of directors  and may  have  some
public disclosure obligations  as well.  Though they lack the demands of
a  profitable  bottom  line,  nonprofits  sustain  themselves  by  satisfying
funders,  whether  individual  or  institutional  donors,  contributors  of
volunteer  time,  or  contracting  partners.  Religious  institutions  may
have  boards  or entirely  different  governance  structures:  some  have  a
102  See ROBERT  COVER, The  Uses of Jurisdictional  Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Inno-
vation,  in  NARRATIVE,  VIOLENCE,  AND  THE  LAW:  THE  ESSAYS  OF  ROBERT  COVER  Si
(Martha Minow et al. eds.,  1992).
103  See,  e.g.,  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,  Pub. L. No. 107-204,  116  Stat. 745; DEL.  CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 141  (1991  & Supp.  2002).
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hierarchical  form;  some  have  endowments,  large  holdings  of property,
and  subsidies  from  national  or  international  organizations;  others
maintain  tiny  storefront  operations,  struggling  to  pay  rent.'0 4  These
institutions can  and should  be accountable  not only to divine authority
but  also  to  people.  A  minimal  level  of regulation  derives  from  the
turnout and donations  of the  faithful, but more  overtly  public  tools  to
promote  accountability  also  exist.  Though  restrained  by  the  Constitu-
tion's Free Exercise  and Establishment  Clauses, state attorneys general
and taxing authorities  retain  limited  tools for  overseeing  nonprofit or-
ganizations.  Accordingly, even  religious  groups remain subject to pub-
lic  scrutiny  that guards  against  fraud,  criminal  conduct,  and abuse  of
donor intentions.
Colossal  failures  in  existing  accountability  practices  across  all  sec-
tors are  ready at hand.  The voting count mess  in the 2000  presidential
election,
0 s  the off-the-books  transactions  of the Enron  Corporation,
1 0 6
the  conflicts  of  interest  within  the  Arthur  Andersen  accounting  and
consulting  businesses, 1 07  the  fraud  perpetrated  by  Tyco  executives, 1 0 8
the  failures  of the  Roman Catholic  Church  to deal  openly and swiftly
with allegations  of sexual  abuse  by  priests  and  to  cooperate  with  law
enforcement  officials, 1 0 9  the  misleading  behavior  of the  Red  Cross  in
soliciting funds  following September  i i,110  and the  diversion  of funds
104  See  LESTER  M.  SALAMON,  AMERICA'S NONPROFIT  SECTOR:  A  PRIMER  31-35  (2d  ed.
1999); Hamil  R. Harris, Route i's Storefront Sanctuaries:  Business Revitalization Could Threaten
Small  Churches,  WASH.  POST,  June  13,  2002  (Prince  George  Extra),  at  9;  Zerline  Hughes
Jennings,  Giving Them  That  01' Storefront Religion: A  Fight for Souls - and Paying the Rent,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 30,  2002  (City Weekly), at 4.
105  See Michael  Cooper, Florida Official Has Dual Roles in a Maelstrom, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.  14,
2oo0,  at Ai; Katharine  Q.  Seelye, Little Change Forecast  for Election Process, N.Y. TIMES,  Apr.
26,  2001, at A14.
106  See  Kurt Eichenwald,  Ex-Enron Official Admits Payments to  Finance Chief:  A  Step for
Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES,  Aug.  22,  2002,  at Ai; James Traub,  The Attorney General Goes to  War,
N.Y. TIMES, June  6,  2002,  § 6 (Magazine), at 38.
107  See  Jonathan  D.  Glater, 4  Audit Firms Are  Set  To  Alter Some  Practices: They  Fear That
Enron May Bring New  Rules, N.Y. TIMES,  Feb.  i,  2002,  at Ai; Floyd Norris, Andersen Told  To
Split Audits and Consulting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.  12,  2002,  at Ci, available at LEXIS, The New York
Times File.
108  See  Andrew Ross Sorkin,  2  Top Tyco Executives Charged with $6o0 Million Fraud  Scheme,
N.Y. TIMES,  Sept.  13,  2002,  at Ai.
109  See  Dean E. Murphy  In Crisis, U.S.  Catholics See Turning Point  for Church, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28,  2002,  at  Ai; Daniel J. Wakin,  Priests  Seek  To Assert Rights and Fight Church Abuse Pol-
icy, N.Y. TIMES,  Oct.  4,  2002,  at  Bi; Greg Winter, Diocese Pays $1.2  Million in Sex Lawsuit: In
New  York, a Priest  Faces a  Rape Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2002,  at AI4.
110  See  David  Barstow,  Red  Cross Agrees  to  Database, N.Y.  TIMES,  Oct.  25,  2001,  at Bio;
Diana B.  Henriques & David Barstow, Red Cross Pledges Entire Terror Fund to Sept. ii  Victims,
N.Y. TIMES,  Nov. 15,  2001,  at Ai;  Katharine  Q.  Seelye & Diana B.  Henriques,  Red Cross Presi-
dent Quits, Saying That the Board Left Her No  Other Choice, N.Y. TIMES,  Oct. 27,  2001,  at B9;
Stephanie Strom, Red Cross Is Pressed To Open Its Books, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2002,  at B7.
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by  executives  at  some  branches  of  the  United  Way'  are  only  a  few
recent, high-profile examples.
Many  observers  attribute  such  abuses  to  systematic  problems.
Failures  in  governmental  accountability  are widespread,  argue  public-
choice  theorists, due to  the  self-interest  of incumbents  and the  dynam-
ics of multiparty  agenda manipulation. 12  Campaign  finance  practices
ensure  that  money, rather  than  popular  votes,  determines  election  re-
sults, and  low voter  turnouts both  reflect and  perpetuate  this problem.
In  addition,  periodic  general  elections  are  too  infrequent  and removed
from day-to-day decisions  to serve as an adequate check.
Corporate boards may fail to watch over management because  they
are  often  composed  of friends  of  the  chief executive  officer  or  people
too busy to be actively involved  in corporate governance. 113  Addition-
ally,  companies  sometimes  fail  because  of  external  events  or  badly
timed expansions,  while  others  sometimes  succeed, at least temporarily,
because  of  hype  or  faulty  financial  statements.  Preoccupation  with
short-term  returns  steers  many  corporations  toward  practices  that  do
not build long-term  value. 114  Structural  rules  and the failure  of share-
holders  to exercise  their voting  powers can  make  it difficult to remove
directors  or  create  healthy  turnover  on  boards  because  the  structures
are tilted  toward  some  purposes  - such  as deterring  takeovers  or de-
ferring to lawyers - other than protecting shareholders.i"
5
I11  See  David  Cay  Johnston,  United  Way  Official  Knew  About  Abuses,  Memo  Says,  N.Y.
TIMES,  Sept.  3,  2002,  at  AT 2;  Stephanie  Strom,  Director  of the  United Way  in  Washington Steps
Down, N.Y. TIMES,  Sept.  6,  2002,  at  AI6;  Peter  Whoriskey,  Charity's Pension Probed by  U.S.;
Documents Sought  from United Way, WASH.  POST, Aug.  22,  2002,  at Bi.
112  See  generally THE  THEORY  OF  PUBLIC  CHOICE  -II  (James M. Buchanan  &  Robert  D.
Tollison  eds.,  1984).  See also PAUL  STARR,  THE LIMITS  OF PRIVATIZATION  5  (1987);  GORDON
TULLOCK  ET  AL.,  GOVERNMENT  FAILURES:  A  PRIMER  IN  PUBLIC  CHOICE  61  (2002);  Paul
Starr, The Meaning of Privatization,  6  YALE  L. &  POLY REv  6  (1988),  quoted in  Leon  Felkins,
Introduction to Public Choice Theory, at http://www.magnolia.net/-leonf/sd/pub-choice.html  (last
revised  Nov. 8,  2001).
113  See  Meredith  Jordan,  Directors in  the Hot Seat, ATLANTA  BUS.  CHRON.,  Feb.  22,  2002,
available at http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/atlantastorie/2002/o2/25/story2.html;  Board &  Direc-
tor Interlocks, at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/products/directorinterlocks.html  (last visited
Nov.  14,  2002);  see  also ROBERT A.G.  MONKS  &  NELL  MINOW,  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE
(2001);  ROBERT  A.G.  MONKS  &  NELL  MINOW,  WATCHING  THE  WATCHERS:  CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FOR THE  2 IST CENTURY (1996).
114  Robert Reich  has given  the label "paper entrepreneurship"  to this short-term  style of corpo-
rate  governance.  See Frank  C.  Genovese,  Government, Management Fostered Drop in  Worker
Output, CHRISTIAN SCI.  MONITOR, Sept. 3, 198o, at i i.
115  See John  C.  Coates  IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers,  89
CAL.  L.  REv  1301  (2001)  (tracing  features  in  takeover  defenses  to  terms  negotiated  by  repeat-
player  lawyers  whose  own  interests  can diverge  from  those of their clients); John  H. Matheson  &
Brent  A.  Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder  Model of Corporate Governance, 76
MINN.  L.  REV.  1313  (1992)  (examining  how  rules  about  board  structure  and  process  impede
monitoring  by institutional investors who are long-term shareholders).
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Nonprofits  often  lack  criteria  to evaluate  their  own  performances;
they  may  also  have  inattentive  boards.  Some  critics  charge  that  too
many  nonprofits  and  too  many  religious  institutions  lack  democratic
procedures.  Other  commentators  defend  elite  or  hierarchical  control.
Still others question elite  control  due to participatory  values  or the  po-
tentially  serious  difficulties  in  recruiting  and  retaining  high-quality
leaders  who have better-paying  and more prestigious opportunities.
Collaboration  between  government  and  private  entities  could  in-
troduce  accountability  tools  from  the  private  sector  and  thereby  im-
prove  performance.  Yet such collaboration could  also divert the public
trust  into  forms  of  conduct  that  already  have  faulty  accountability
procedures  or use  accountability  mechanisms  inadequate  to  the public
tasks.  How  can  the  new  privatization  experiments  draw  on  the  best
and not descend  to the worst forms  of accountability?  At a minimum,
the  accountability  framework  itself must be public  in the source  of its
norms and in its overarching authority and enforcement  power. 116
VII.  TOWARD A PUBLIC  FRAMEWORK  OF ACCOUNTABILITY
What would  constitute  a public framework  of accountability  when
governments  privatize  functions  or  activities  that  have  been  public?
Such  a  framework  should  preserve  and  revitalize  the  conception  of
"public" that puts  people at  the  center,  for  it is  the  people  whom  the
government  is  supposed  to  serve.  Albert  Hirschman's  classic  state-
ment of exit, voice, and loyalty - the three options through which  peo-
ple can  hold  organizations  accountable" 7  - provides  a useful  starting
point.  The polity  must ensure  that governments,  as representatives  of
the  public,  retain  the  option  to  exit relationships  with  private  entities,
the means to express  disagreements with the  ways in which the private
entities proceed,  and the capacity  to remain with  the private  entity  as
a  vote  of confidence.  Similarly, when  a  government  creates  a school
voucher  scheme,  it should  enhance the  avenues  for  individual  families
to exit schools - public  or private  - that they  find unacceptable,  but
also  strengthen  the  procedures  permitting families  to express  their  de-
sires for, and criticisms of, the schools, or to embrace  an existing school
as long as it satisfies public requirements monitored by the government.
116  In  other  countries,  a  more  radical  approach  than  the  one  proposed  here  extends  public
norms throughout private  activities.  See, e.g.,  COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  (Vicki C.
Jackson  &  Mark  Tushnet  eds.,  1999);  POLITICAL  CULTURE  AND  CONSTITUTIONALISM:  A
COMPARATIVE  APPROACH (Daniel  P Franklin  &  Michael J.  Baun  eds.,  1995).  For a thoughtful
effort  to  develop  criteria  for  extending  public  norms  into private  activities,  see  Freeman,  supra
note 4.
117  See ALBERT  0.  HIRSCHMAN,  EXIT, VOICE,  AND  LOYALTY:  RESPONSES  TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,  AND  STATES (1970).
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For governments  hoping  to achieve  both the  desired ends  and  per-
ceived  legitimacy  of constitutional  democracy, there  are  four  relevant
legal  traditions  of accountability.  The first tradition,  which  often sur-
prises  nonlawyers,  is  the  model of contract  law.  Centrally  concerned
with  ensuring  freedom  to  exchange  promises,  contract  law  is  no  less
dependent  upon  public  enforcement.  Public  enforcement  of  private
promises  involves  courts  and  arbitration  (or the  mere  threat  of  their
use),  rules  about  what  kinds  of  promises  will  be  enforceable,  and
norms  about  what  kinds  of  sanctions  can  be  imposed.  Governments
often  use contracts  when working  with private entities  to deliver social
services  or to  manage  schools  or prisons.  A  public framework  for  ac-
countability for these activities would disclose the facts surrounding  the
contracting process  to the  public and permit concerned citizens  to con-
tribute  to  the terms of those  contracts.  It would  ensure that the  gov-
ernment  does  not  enter  into  any  contracts  that  undermine  constitu-
tional  or  legislative  commitments,  absent  public  decisions  to  change
those  overarching  rules.  And  it would  create  and  maintain  a viable
process  for  enforcing  the contracts,  including substantive  terms, proce-
dures  for  resolving  disputes,  and  mechanisms  for  terminating  con-
tracts. 118  None of these  elements  would infringe upon  a private  realm.
Indeed,  these  elements  would  protect  and  strengthen  the  quality  of
public  expenditures  and  the  avenues  for  ordinary  people  to  know
about  and evaluate  these  government  practices.  Recent  decisions  by
school  systems  to  terminate  relationships  with  the  Edison  for-profit
school  corporation  indicate  not  only  disappointment  with  results  but
also the importance  of ongoing public accountability. 11 9
A second legal  model for governmental  accountability  imposes con-
stitutional  obligations  on  the  government.  If the  government  chooses
to  fulfill  its obligations  by working  with  private entities,  it  should not
be able to bypass those constitutionally defined  obligations.  Where the
explicit  terms of a constitution attach only to a government actor - as
118  Although  many  existing  contracts  lack  performance  measures  and  bases  for  oversight,
strong and  workable contracts with private  vendors can  be designed to ensure  that disadvantaged
recipients  receive  intended services,  with protections  for their civil  rights.  See Eileen  P. Sweeney
et  al.,  Language Matters: Designing State and County Contracts for Services  Under Temporary
Assistance  for Needy Families,  35  CLEARINGHOUSE REV  508, 513,  5 16-25,  529 (2002).
119  See  Michael  A.  Fletcher,  Private Enterprise, Public Woes in  Phila. Schools, WASH.  POST,
Sept.  17,  2002,  at  Ai;  Scott  S.  Greenberger,  2d School  Severs  Ties  with  For-Profit, BOSTON
GLOBE, May  26,  2001,  at Bi; Ed Hayward,  Charters  Leave Their Roots; Schools Part Ways with
For-Profits,  BOSTON  HERALD, June  16,  2002,  at  8;  Kim  L. Hooper, Charter  Jettisons Pact with
SABIS,  INDIANAPOLIS  STAR,  Aug. 30, 2002,  at B 4; Erika Niedowski,  Woes Growing, Educator's
Fate in  the Balance, BALT. SUN, Sept. 28,  2002,  at  IA;  Eric Siegel  & Jean  Thompson, EAI Facing
Cancellation of Contracts, BALT.  SUN,  Nov.  18,  1995,  at  iA;  Anand Vaishnav, Another Charter
School Cuts Its Ties, BOSTON  GLOBE, Aug.  2, 2002,  at B2.
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is true  of the Equal  Protection  and Due  Process Clauses
1 20  and, by ex-
tension,  of  § 1983's  private  right  of  action  against  government  actors
who  violate  individuals'  constitutional  rights
21  - a  government
should  not  try  to  perform  an  end-run  around  those  obligations  by
delegating tasks to an entity not covered by these provisions.  To guard
against such  a risk, governments should  explicitly require  that contrac-
tual  partners  or  organizations  eligible  for  vouchers  provide  equal
treatment or due process protections.  Preserving  a forum  where people
can raise complaints about noncompliance  is another important part of
the  constitutional  model  of accountability.  In  addition,  constitutional
values  are  meant  to  guard  against self-dealing  or other  conflicts  of in-
terest  that  arise  when  private  parties  are  entrusted  with  public  du-
ties.
122
Administration,  the  third  model  of accountability,  is  too  often  dis-
missed  as  bureaucracy.  Admittedly, administrative  action  can  become
bureaucratic,  complex,  slow  to  change,  driven  by  thirst  for  power
rather  than results, and characterized  by inflexibility.  Many  privatiza-
tion efforts  grow from precisely  such  critiques  of public  bureaucracies.
Yet  administration  need  not  descend  into  bureaucracy  - and  if  it
does, it can do so to ensure  systematic  collection  of information  needed
to  assess  results  and  practices  and deter  abuse.  Some  paperwork,  in
short, is  what permits  accountability, especially  when  it comes  to cost
accounting  and  evaluation  of  performance.  We  count  what  we  care
about.  Requirements  to  collect  information  about  applicants  for
vouchers,  attrition  from  schools,  decreases  in  staff, or  complaints  by
recipients  may add paperwork  to the leaner  operations of private  enti-
ties,  but  the  resulting  data  are  essential  to  monitoring  the  quality  of
schools,  social  services,  and  prison  programs.  The  challenge  is  to  re-
quire the  reporting of information that is essential  to assess compliance
while  ensuring  that  entities  are  not  subject  to  mindless  reporting  re-
quirements.
The  fourth  legal  model  for  accountability  is  democracy.  Democ-
racy  involves  both the  processes  and  values  committed  to  governance
by  the  people.  This  model  usually translates  into  popular voting, but
it need not take the form of referenda or up-or-down  votes on an  entire
120  ERWIN  CHEMERINSKY,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW:  PRINCIPLES  AND  POLICIES  385-94
(1997).  Although  the  courts  have  recognized  an exception  to  the  state  action  requirement  for  a
private actor  performing  a public function,  the exception  is  narrow and has not  been extended  to
schools.  Id. at 395-403.
121  To  prevail under  §  1983,  the plaintiff must show  that the defendant  acted "under  color of"
state  law, even  if the  state  did  not  authorize  the  action.  See,  e.g.,  CHARLES  ALAN  WRIGHT,
THE  LAW  OF  FEDERAL  COURTS  120  (4th ed.  1983);  Michael  Wells,  Constitutional  Remedies,
Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 MISS.  L.J. 157  (1998).
122  See  Dru  Stevenson,  Privatized  Welfare  and  the  Nondelegation  Doctrine,  35
CLEARINGHOUSE  REV. 546,  549-52 (2002).
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program.  Democratic  values can also inform  the design  of administra-
tive review  processes  and  contracting  mechanisms.  Disclosure  of rele-
vant  information,  accompanied  by  periodic  occasions  for  the  expres-
sion  of  public  views  on  particular  privatization  decisions  and  the
standards  set and used to assess them,  would  advance democratic  val-
ues and the public identity they reflect  and create.
How  can  accountability  mechanisms  themselves  be  held  account-
able?  This  is not merely a cute exercise in reflexivity.  Instead, it serves
as a reminder  to attend  to what otherwise  might be missed by  familiar
methods for  assessing  particular  procedures  or decisions.  What  might
be missed?  How  about  the  unintended  or  collateral  consequences  of
particular privatization  decisions?  If  the introduction  of vouchers  lets
more  people  select  private  schooling,  and  the  percentage  of  children
enrolled  in  private  schools  shifts  from  its  current  level  of  0%123  to
25%  or  50%,  what  will  be  the  effects  on  social  cohesion  and  trust in
public  institutions?
The  accretion  of multiple decisions  by  governments to contract  out
public  services  or to use  vouchers  for private  programs  can  transform
the  character  of society, the  prospects  for equality  and mutual  respect,
and the  sense  of community  across  lines of difference.  Therefore,  the
cumulative impact of privatization  decisions calls for evaluation in light
of public values.  This evaluation requires gathering information  on  ac-
tual  government  spending to  determine  whether  the  new policies  alter
spending  levels  or  instead  simply  shift  the  agents  assigned  to  imple-
ment the  policies.  Who  is  capable  of  performing  that kind  of assess-
ment of changing  policies  and their effects  over time?  Perhaps  a pub-
lic  commission,  ideally  composed  of  representatives  from  both  the
public  and  private  sectors,  could  periodically  review  the  cumulative
effects  of privatization  decisions.  Alternatively, a  legislative or  admin-
istrative  body  could hold  hearings  on  the  effects  of privatization  and
consider  adopting  guidelines  for  government  contracting  or  other pri-
vatization  measures.  The  mere  existence  of  a  government  initiative
would  provide a focal  point for reporting by private,  nongovernmental
groups  as  well  as  an  occasion  for  media  attention,  public  education
and  debate,  and  citizen  action.  Difficulties  in  mobilizing  these  vital
vehicles  for  democratic  accountability  regarding  the  general  topic  of
privatization  would  be considerably  reduced  if a  government  commis-
sion  or public  hearings  served  as the  focus  of media and  public  atten-
tion.  Without  such  efforts,  privatization  poses  serious  risks  to  public
values,  democratic  control,  and  people's  understanding  of the  choices
being made  in their names.
123  Stephen  P. Broughman  & Lenore A.  Colaciello, Private School Universe Survey: t999-
2ooo, at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2002/quarterly/fall/q 3-4.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
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If  the  language  of competition  and  consumption  overtakes  social
provision  in  education  and  welfare,  what  will  be  the  effect  on  civic
commitment?  Will  people  learn to  be consumers  rather  than  citizens,
with  a  reduced  sense  of collective  commitment?  How  will  privatiza-
tion  affect  people's  willingness  to  vote  or  to  make  sacrifices  for  na-
tional  defense?  If  the  accountability  measures  do  not  capture  these
kinds of effects,  then they are not themselves  accountable  to the public
values  of democracy, equality, and even  public safety.  Hence,  a vigor-
ous  framework  for  public  accountability  will  require  inventive  and
searching  inquiry into our  collective  commitments,  our disagreements,
and our chances  both  to change and to adhere  to prior values.  This is
also the  kind  of task that is  irreducibly public.  Testing accountability
requirements in light of public values  is not a task to be contracted  out
to a  private  enterprise.  For  it is  through  the  process  of  participatory
inquiry into the values  that it uses  to govern that the polity constitutes
itself.  124
No  small part  of this effort  must include creative  ways  to generate
demand  for  information  about  the  processes  of  privatization,  the
measures  of  accountability,  and  the  space  for  public  participation.
Unless  communities  work  to ensure  that more  people  have  the  capac-
ity to make these  demands, governments will not be accountable  when
they use  private  methods  to  meet  public  needs.  Here,  as  in  so  many
settings,  the  preconditions  for  constitutional  democracy  are  also  its
stated  values;  a  population  with  the  freedom  and  equality  to  pursue
self-governance  is both the end  and the  means  of our political  system.
Vouchers,  contracts,  joint  ventures,  and  partnerships  among  govern-
ments,  religious groups,  nonprofits,  and for-profit  companies  could  ei-
ther undermine  this alignment  of ends and means  or strengthen  it and
the values  of pluralism  and freedom  it pursues.  The direction  is up to
US.
124 Some  may  view other  activities, such  as running  prisons, as  importantly  public  in  light  of
symbolic  or political  effects.  The demarcation  of public  and private identities  ultimately  must  be
made and monitored  by public processes  of democracy and law.
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